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Consider these facts: An often-debilitating brain disease afflicts
millions of Americans. This disease is one of the country's greatest killers.
Its victims frequently suffer from depression and many physical ailments,
and often become unable to work effectively. The disease costs the U.S.
economy hundreds of billions of dollars annually-more than cancer, more
than heart disease.' Fortunately, although no cure exists, medical treatment
can enable recipients to live normal, healthy, and productive lives.
Treatment is cheap compared to many other common medical procedures
and is highly cost-effective.2 Now consider this: For the vast majority of
victims of this disease, effective treatment is inaccessible. Most health
insurance plans either do not cover it or put a variety of limits on coverage
that do not apply to other diseases. Unless they can pay out of pocket,
victims cannot get the treatment they need. To make matters worse, they are
often told that their condition is not a real disease, or that it is their fault, or
that suffering from it makes them a criminal.
The disease is drug and alcohol addiction, and the facts are real.
Ubiquitous benefit caps on insurance coverage of substance abuse treatment
put effective recovery out of reach for most addicts. In this Note, I assess
the nature of this problem and some possible ways to address it. The
general principle that I advocate is substance abuse treatment parity, which
means that insurance plans should provide coverage for addiction treatment
that is equivalent to that provided for analogous conditions. In some cases,
failure to provide such parity should be considered illegal disability
discrirmintion on the part of employers and insurers. Moreover, new laws
should be adopted to require insurance parity explicitly.
1. Shift in Congress on Drug Policy Reform: Legislation Eliminates Discrimination in Health
Plans for Substance Abuse Treatment, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 22, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library,
U.S. Newswire File (citing estimates by Physician Leadership on National Drug Policy).
2. See infra Section II.D.
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In Part I, I review the current status of insurance coverage of addiction
treatment and assess the scope of the shortfall and possible reasons behind
it. In Part II, I set forth the case for insurance parity, including the nature
and costs of the disease of addiction and the efficacy and cost-effectiveness
of treatment, and consider some counterarguments. In Part III, I analyze the
requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as they pertain
to insurance parity, drawing on the precedents set by recent challenges to
other types of insurance discrimination. I conclude that the ADA should be
interpreted to require parity in some cases, but that the potential
effectiveness of this litigation strategy is limited-new reforms are
necessary. In Part IV, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of current
legislative proposals to accomplish insurance parity, and focus especially
on the Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act. Finally, in Part V, I offer my
conclusions and recommendations for legal change and advocacy.
I. CURRENT SHORTFALLS IN INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF ADDICTION TREATMENT
Most Americans benefit from health insurance plans provided by their
employer or the employer of a family member.3 Others are covered by
Medicare or Medicaid, or purchase individual or family plans from a
private insurer or health maintenance organization (HMO).4 Among
employers who provide insurance, some-generally very large
companies-are self-insurers, meaning that they serve as their own
insurance company, while others purchase group plans from third-party
insurers. Approximately thirty-nine million Americans are uninsured.5 Even
among those who have insurance policies, however, coverage of alcohol
and drug addiction treatment is often limited or absent.6 In some cases,
3. U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage: 2000, http://www.census.gov/hhes/
hlthins/hlthinhlt00asc.htmI (last modified Sept. 28, 2001) (stating that 64.1% of Americans are
covered by employer-provided health insurance).
4. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2000, 24.2% of Americans had government
insurance while about 72.4% carried private insurance, whether obtained through an employer or
otherwise. Fourteen percent of Americans are uninsured. Id Note that the sum of these
percentages (72.4% + 24.2% + 14%) exceeds 100% because many people carry two or more types
of insurance. See id. (noting, for example, that 7.6% of Americans carry both private health
insurance and Medicare).
5. Ronald Brownstein, A New Worry About an Old Concern: Health Care, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
7, 2002, at A 14.
6. Throughout this Note, I use the terms "addiction treatment" and "substance abuse
treatment" interchangeably unless the context demands otherwise. "Addiction" and "substance
abuse" are not the same thing from a clinical or practical perspective, but the policy literature on
insurance parity often uses the terms interchangeably, since treatment regimens for both are
similar and are treated the same way by insurance policies. Cf Nicholas F. Fleming et al., What
Are Substance Abuse and Addiction?, in SOURCE BOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ADDICTION
3, 8 (Lawrence S. Friedman et al. eds., 1996) (defining "addiction" as "compulsive use and
impaired control of intake of a drug despite its adverse consequences," and "substance abuse,"
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insurers entirely exclude coverage of addiction. More frequently, addiction
treatment is subject to monetary caps and other limitations on coverage that
do not apply to treatment of other diseases! Frequently, coverage is limited
to brief, one-shot treatment programs with no long-term maintenance
care-a strategy with little chance of success.8 The coverage gap is far more
severe for employees of small businesses; although 90% of Fortune 500
companies have Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs), which are
programs designed specially to deal with substance abuse treatment
(although they may not provide insurance parity), few small businesses
have them.9 Substance abuse treatment may be most lacking for
adolescents, for whom specialized care is rarely covered and whose parents
may already have exhausted their family plan's lifetime addiction treatment
allotment.1 0 Overall, fewer than 10% of all American workers have a health
insurance plan that treats addiction equivalently to analogous diseases."
Some estimates suggest that only 2% of substance abusers have health
insurance plans that provide adequate coverage for treatment.
2
These inequalities in treatment coverage have long been a part of the
insurance landscape. Nonetheless, the gaps are becoming even wider as a
consequence of the rise of managed care. Managed care has, over a short
period of time, become the dominant force in American health care,
representing a 29% share of the health insurance market for American
workers in 1988 and over 80% today. 3 Unlike a traditional third-party
insurance plan, an HMO (the most common form of managed-care plan) is
from a diagnostic perspective, as "intermittent impaired control of substance use," and, as a
colloquial term, as "drug use that violates social standards or causes self-harm" ).
7. In addition to monetary caps, these limitations include caps on the number of days of care
or on the number of visits, higher copayments, and higher deductibles. Substance Abuse
Treatment Parity: A Viable Solution to the Nation's Epidemic of Addiction?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the House Comm. on
Government Reform, 106th Cong. 27 (1999) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Rep.
Ramstad). Copayments as high as 50% are common. David C. Lewis, Limits on Substance Abuse
Benefits and the Quest for Parity with Other Chronic Diseases, BROWN U. DIG. ADDICTION
THEORY & APPLICATION, Oct. 1996, at 12. 12.
8. Janet Firshein, PBS Online, Legislating Insurance Parity for Addiction Treatment, at
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/closetohome/policy/htmlhinsurance.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2002)
(citing Norman Hoffman of the Center for Alcohol and Addiction Studies at Brown University).
9. Thomas R. Burke, The Economic Impact of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 103 PuB.
HEALTH REP. 564, 567 (1988).
i0. . Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy St' r bs-nce Abse Preveinrinn
Assessment, and Treatment Financing for Children and Adolescents, 108 PEDIATRICS 1025, 1026
(2001) (noting that families "rapidly exhaust their annual and even lifetime allotment of substance
abuse benefits"); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Insurance Coverage of
Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services for Children and Adolescents: A Consensus
Statement, 106 PEDIATRICS 860 (2000) (stating that children and adolescents lack necessary
coverage for substance abuse treatment).
II. Lewis, supra note 7, at 12.
12. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 3 (statement of Rep. Mica).
13. Janet Firshein, PBS Online, How Managed Care Is Affccting Addiction Treatment, at
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/closetohome/treatment/htmlmanaged.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
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both insurer and care provider-the doctors work for the same company
that pays for treatment. This creates cost-cutting incentives that help control
insurance premiums, but may compromise the quality of care.'
4
These cost pressures appear to have had an especially serious effect on
addiction treatment. A Hay Group report showed that between 1988 and
1998, employer spending on substance abuse treatment benefits declined by
74.5%, while employers' overall health benefit spending declined by just
11.5%.5 A 1996 Village Voice article reported that, as a result of these
pressures, over half of the country's private treatment centers had closed
over the course of a decade.' 6 In addition, quality of care may be declining.
Whereas a twenty-eight-day inpatient program used to be common, today
inpatient stays average only 7.7 days, which may be insufficient to provide
the necessary care. 7 Some studies have found that relapse rates have
increased as a result.1 8
Despite the bleakness of this picture and the considerable obstacles to
change," recent years have seen the quiet growth of a pro-treatment
movement. This movement is grounded in a coalition of people in recovery,
treatment providers, medical experts, some sympathetic political leaders,
and even a range of businesses that have found that providing treatment
coverage makes economic sense. In terms of health insurance coverage, the
focal point of this movement has been "treatment parity." The concept of
"parity" implies equal treatment or, more simply, fairness. While allowing
health insurance plans flexibility in terms of setting the actual amount of
coverage for substance abuse treatment, parity advocates demand only that
this amount be fair by comparison to coverage for analogous conditions.
Parity advocates have won some victories in recent years. Eight states now
have laws mandating some degree of substance abuse treatment parity,2"
although these laws have been criticized for their incompleteness.2 In 1999,
President Clinton announced that the Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan
14. Dissatisfaction with HMO care appears to be a motivating factor behind current
legislative reform efforts. For example, House Speaker Dennis Hastert has criticized HMOs for
putting health care decisions into the hands of "bureaucrats" rather than doctors and patients. J.
Dennis Hasten, Finally, Help for HMO Patients, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at 31.
15. 147 CONG. REC. S2733 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (citing a
1998 Hay Group report).
16. Firshein, supra note 13 (citing a 1996 Village Voice article).
17. Id.; see also Managed Care Provider Magellan Terminates Caron Foundation Contract,
CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 5, 2001, at http://news.cnet.com/investor/news/newsitern/0-9900-1028-
7786092-O.html (discussing a managed care company's practice of providing an average of three
to five days of care).
18. Firshein, supra note 13 (citing University of Pennsylvania studies).
19. See infra Subsection II.E.3.
20. See House Hearings, supra note 7, at 35 (statement of Rep. Mica).
21. See id. (statement of Rep. Ramstad).
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would adopt full parity for substance abuse and mental health treatment by
2001.22
II. THE CASE FOR INSURANCE PARITY
The issues surrounding insurance coverage of addiction treatment are
complex, in part because of the very nature of the health insurance business.
There is no such thing as truly "comprehensive" health insurance-i.e.,
insurance that covers every medical treatment. Insurance companies
routinely determine what procedures they will and will not cover on the
basis of considerations such as the seriousness of the underlying condition
and the cost and effectiveness of the treatment. Because of the constantly
changing landscape of medical science, decisions about whether to cover
certain procedures are frequently controversial. It is thus understandable
that politicians are often reluctant to jump into the fray by issuing coverage
mandates that would take discretion over coverage decisions away from
insurance professionals.
Nonetheless, considerable medical and economic evidence supports the
argument that mandatory insurance parity for addiction treatment is an idea
whose time has come. Studies have shown that treatment is both medically
effective and cost-effective. The recovery movement's focus on parity sets
a modest goal: requiring not that all insurers provide comprehensive
coverage of addiction, but simply that they treat addiction equivalently to
analogous diseases. This Part sets forth the medical, social, and economic
arguments for insurance parity for drug and alcohol addiction treatment.23
A. Addiction Is a Disease
The first major barrier faced by proponents of drug and alcohol
treatment coverage consists of convincing the public and policymakers that
addiction is, in fact, a medical illness requiring medical treatment. Alive as
it may be in the public mind, the idea that people are addicts by choice has
22. Letter from Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, to
Representative Patsy T. Mink (Oct. 20, 1999), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 7, at 9.
23. in this Note, I focus on the rtreatmnt of midirtinn to alcohol and illegal drugs but not on
addiction to nicotine. There are several reasons for this focus: First, it is consistent with the
approach taken by most other literature assessing treatment access; second, nicotine addiction has
a very different, though also very serious, set of social and economic consequences; third,
treatment for nicotine addiction varies significantly from treatment for other forms of addiction,
and therefore efficacy and cost-effectiveness assessments may be quite different. Nonetheless, one
could easily make an argument, along the lines of the argument presented in this Note, in favor of
requiring insurance coverage of smoking cessation programs. Smoking kills over 430,000
Americans each year, but most health plans do not cover smoking cessation programs.
SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, BRANDEIS UNIV., SUBSTANCE ABUSE: THE NATION'S
NUMBER ONE HEALTH PROBLEM 6, 114 (2001).
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long since lost currency among medical experts. Medical descriptions of
addiction as a disease date to the eighteenth century. 24 The American
Medical Association first officially recognized addiction as a disease in
1956.25 Today, a remarkably uniform consensus in the scientific community
supports this characterization. As Time recently reported: "Americans tend
to think of drug addiction as a failure of character. But this stereotype is
beginning to give way to the recognition that drug dependence has a clear
biological basis. 'Addiction... is a disorder of the brain no different from
other forms of mental illness."' 2 6 This conclusion has been confirmed by a
litany of scientific studies.27
Recently, scientists have begun to acquire a greater understanding of
the neurological and chemical mechanisms by which addiction develops.
For example, a 1997 study by Yale School of Medicine researchers Eric
Nestler and George Aghajanian documented a range of changes in brain
function resulting from repeated exposure to addictive drugs. Changes in
the physical structure of certain neurotransmitter receptors, as well as
changes in the rates of some forms of neurotransmission, create the
chemical conditions that produce behavioral changes: dependence,
tolerance, sensitization, and craving.28 Nestler and Aghajanian explain:
Addiction is a complex phenomenon with important psychological
and social causes and consequences. However, at its core, it
involves a biological process: the effects of repeated exposure to a
biological agent (drug) on a biological substrate (brain) over time.
Ultimately, adaptations that drug exposure elicits in individual
neurons alter the function of those neurons, which in turn alters the
functioning of the neural circuits in which those neurons operate."
24. John N. Chappel, Attitudes Toward the Treatment of Substance Abusers, in SUBSTANCE
ABUSE 983, 984 (Joyce H. Lowinson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992) (citing a statement of Benjamin
Rush, the "father of American psychiatry"); see also DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA 224
(Steven R. Belenko ed., 2000) (excerpting an 1894 statement of Dr. Paul Sollier). In the early
1920s, the short-lived narcotic clinic movement pushed for expansion of access to medical
treatment for poor addicts. See DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA, supra, at 226 (excerpting
a statement of Dr. Willis P. Butler).
25. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 28 (statement of Rep. Ramstad).
26. J. Madeleine Nash, Addicted: Why Do People Get Hooked? Mounting Evidence Points to
a Powerful Brain Chemical Called Dopamine, TIME, May 5, 1997, at 68, 70 (quoting Dr. Nora
Volkow of the Brookhaven National Laboratory).
27. Matthew Antinosi, Note, Respect for the Law Is No Excuse: Drug Addiction History &
Public Safety Officer Qualifications ... Are Public Employers Breaking the Law?, 60 OHIo ST.
L.J. 711, 716-18 (1999) (reviewing the scientific literature, including reports by the National
Institutes of Health).
28. Eric J. Nestler & George K. Aghajanian, Molecular and Cellular Basis of Addiction, 278
SCIENCE 58, 58 (1997).
29. Id.; see also Eliot L. Gardner, Brain Reward Mechanisms, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra
note 24, at 70, 86-88 (describing changes to neural reward pathways caused by repeated exposure
to addictive substances).
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Some studies suggest that these changes may involve effects on a single
neural pathway common to all or almost all forms of addiction: the
mesolimbic reward system."
Most drug and alcohol users do not become addicted. The likelihood of
addiction is affected by a variety of factors that scientists are only
beginning to understand. Strong evidence from a variety of studies
demonstrates a genetic component of susceptibility to addiction." In
addition, a person's life experiences may influence his or her likelihood of
becoming an addict. Physical abuse as a child increases the likelihood of
later substance abuse.32 Parental substance abuse and attendant abuse and
neglect can also engender a cycle of future use in children.33
A National Institutes of Health (NIH) study found that 7.4% of adult
Americans abuse alcohol and 1.5% abuse illicit drugs. A smaller percentage
is actually chemically dependent: 4.4% on alcohol and 0.5% on illicit
drugs. 4 Furthermore, addiction is a disease that does not discriminate in
terms of race, gender, or social class; current and recovering addicts are
found in all walks of life." Seventy percent of drug abusers and 75% of
alcoholics are employed.36
B. Health, Social, and Economic Costs of Untreated Addiction
The human and economic costs of untreated drug and alcohol addiction
are staggering. Many of these costs are borne by employers and by society
as a whole, but it is worth focusing first on the private suffering
experienced by the addict and his or her family. Untreated addicts
experience a wide range of direct health consequences from their illness; a
1993 Brandeis University study found that 25-40% of all people in general
30. Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCIENCE 45 (1997).
31. Alcoholism: Researchers Find Gene Mutation That Protects Against Addiction, GENE
THERAPY WKLY., Jan. 10, 2002, at 9; Robert M. Anthenelli & Marc A. Schucldt, Genetics, in
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 24, at 39, 39-40 (discussing studies comparing alcoholism rates in
identical and fraternal twins that provide strong evidence of a genetic link); Fleming et al., supra
note 6, at 9.
32. Melissa Bush et al., Substance Abuse and Family Dynamics, in SOURCE BOOK OF
SUBSTANCE AP, csE A ND AnD!CI7TN, srar note 6, at 7, 61 (noting that among current substance
users, "physical abuse occurred in 55% of the households in which they were raised").
33. Id. (noting that 83% of substance users have a history of substance abuse in their
households as children).
34. HENRICK HARWOOD ET AL., NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE & NAT'L INST. ON ALCOHOL
ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED
STATES 1992, at 2-2 (1998).
35. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 16.
36. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 3 (statement of Rep. Mica); see also Office of Nat'l
Drug Control Policy, Statement on Parity for Substance Abuse Treatment I (Mar. 5, 1999),
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 7, at 10, 10.
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hospital beds are there because of alcoholism-related conditions alone. 37
Drug and alcohol addicts frequently experience depression and are at thirty
times greater risk of suicide than nonaddicts. 3' The American Society of
Addiction Medicine has stated that "the progression of untreated addictive
disease has significant impact on the prevalence of a variety of physical and
mental disorders and on the expenditures required" to treat them.39 In
particular, "the interface between addictive disorder and HIV infection is
one of the major public health challenges facing the nation. ' Unsafe use
of intravenous drugs is directly or indirectly responsible for more than one-
third of all AIDS deaths to date in the United States." Intravenous drug use
also increases transmission of tuberculosis and hepatitis B and C.4"
Substance abuse causes substantially increased use of the health care
system, and particularly of expensive emergency room and trauma care
services. Sixty-five percent of all emergency room visits are related to drug
and alcohol problems.43 Alcohol abusers spend four times the average
number of days in hospital care, largely because of increased rates of
injury.' Many types of accidents are highly correlated with alcohol abuse:
13-63% of falls, 33-61% of fatal fires, and one-third of drownings.45 In
addition, alcohol abuse causes close to half of all fatalities in motor vehicle
accidents. 6 Alcoholism causes liver disease, which is often fatal, and many
forms of neurological pathology.47 In total, more than 100,000 people die in
the United States each year because of alcohol-related problems, while
nearly 16,000 deaths each year result directly from abuse of illegal drugs,
not including indirect effects such as accidents and drug-related disease
37. P'ship for Recovery, The Impact of Treatment on Substance Abuse, at
http://www.parmershipforrecovery.org/fctinfo2.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2002) (citing a 1993
study by the Institute for Health Policy at Brandeis University).
38. P'ship for Recovery, Addiction Kills..., at http://www.partnershipforrecovery.org/
fctinfol.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
39. Am. Soc'y of Addiction Med., Public Policy of ASAM: Addiction Medicine and Health
Insurance Reform (Apr. 1, 1992), at http://www.asam.org/ppollAddiction%20Medicine%20
and%20Health%201nsurance%2OReform.htm.
40. Id.
41. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 45 ("More than one-third of all
AIDS deaths in the United States have occurred among injecting drug users and their sexual
partners.").
42. HARWOOD ET AL., supra note 34, at 5-9.
43. See House Hearings, supra note 7, at 55 (statement of R. Michael Conley, Chairman of
the Board of Trustees, Hazelden Foundation, on behalf of the Partnership for Recovery).
44. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 58.
45. Id. at 52.
46. HARWOOD ET AL., supra note 34, at 5-6.
47. Donald W. Goodwin, Alcohol: Clinical Aspects, in SUBSTANCE ABuSE, supra note 24, at
144, 147.
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transmission.48 On average, those who die of alcohol-related conditions lose
twenty-six years of life.49
Untreated addiction has catastrophic impacts on those close to the
addict, especially family members. Health experts agree that drug and
alcohol abuse are "inextricably linked" to problems including child abuse
and other family violence." Addiction, especially to alcohol, is highly
correlated with domestic violence; in one study, 78% of female victims who
survived domestic violence attacks reported that their attacker had been
using drugs or, more commonly, drinking.5" Alcoholism is also strongly
associated with rape and sexual assault.52
Addiction also leads to abuse and neglect of children; for example, one
study found that nearly half of the fathers who sexually abused their
children were alcoholics,53 while another found that child abuse or neglect
occurred 3.6 times more often in families with alcoholic members than in
those without.5 4 The number of children affected is by any measure
enormous; though estimates range widely, up to ten million children may be
living with chemically dependent parents at any given time.55 Some forms
of prenatal substance exposure have documented negative effects on fetal
and child development; this may affect up to 20% of newborn children in
America.56 Abuse of alcohol by pregnant women causes one in every ten
cases of mental retardation.57 Substance abuse may lead to the breakup of
families; for example, alcoholics have high rates of divorce,58 and parental
use of drugs or alcohol contributes to at least three-fourths of cases where
children are removed from their families and placed in foster care.59
Furthermore, untreated addiction inflicts many costs on U.S. employers
every year. A 1996 study by the Bureau of National Affairs estimated that
48. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 6, 54; see also HARWOOD ET
AL., supra note 34, at 1-3 (stating that in 1992, 107,400 people died due to alcohol abuse and
25,500 died due to drug abuse).
49. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 50.
50. Patti Juliana & Carolyn Goodman, Children of Substance Abusing Parents, in
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 24, at 808, 808.
51. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 62, 65.
52. Id. at 66 (noting that most cases of sexual abuse involve alcohol); Charles Winick,
Substances of Use and Abuse and Sexual Behavior, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 24, at 722,
726 (stating that up to half of all rapes are linked to alcohol use).
53. Bush et aL., supra note 32, at 65; see also id. at 57, 63 (describing the cycle of family
violence, neglect, and future substance abuse engendered by untreated substafwuo abuse).
54. Hank Resnik et al., Child Welfare and Substance Abuse: Premises, Programs, and
Policies, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE, FAMILY VIOLENCE, AND CHILD WELFARE 96, 99 (Robert L.
Hampton et al. eds., 1998) (citing findings of the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect).
55. Id at 101 (reviewing a range of studies).
56. Brenda Jones Harden, Building Bridges for Children: Addressing the Consequences of
Exposure to Drugs and to the Child Welfare System, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE, FAMILY VIOLENCE,
AND CHILD WELFARE, supra note 54, at 18, 18-27.
57. Resnik et al., supra note 54, at 99.
58. Goodwin, supra note 47, at 146.
59. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 64.
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addiction costs U.S. businesses $200 billion every year.' This estimate
encompasses half a billion lost workdays, premature deaths of workers
including on-the-job accidents, and health treatment costs including fetal
alcohol syndrome and AIDS. Other studies have further documented each
of these factors. For example, researchers estimate that close to half of all
workplace accidents are caused by alcohol abuse alone.6 Indeed, it is
alcohol, not illegal drugs, that costs U.S. businesses by far the most each
year.62 Substance abusers file five times as many workers' compensation
claims as do nonabusers, have twice as many unexcused absences, and are
tardy three times as often.63
In addition, the U.S. public absorbs a wide range of costs of addiction
in the forms of lost productivity, social deterioration, and direct financial
burdens on government programs.'M A study by the HMO Kaiser
Permanente found that treatment led to a 50% reduction in patients' days of
hospital utilization. 5 Treatment of fetal alcohol syndrome and other
prenatal drug exposure exacts billions of dollars in additional social costs.66
Each premature death due to untreated addiction costs the economy almost
$350,000.67 A 2001 Brandeis University study estimated that, in total,
untreated alcohol abuse costs Americans $166.5 billion every year, and
drug abuse costs $109.9 billion.6" An NIH study analyzing economic data
from 1992 found that alcohol and drug abuse cost society $246 billion
during that year.69
60. P'ship for Recovery, Workplace Surveys Show Benefits, at
http:I/www.partnershipforrecovery.org/newsr3.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2002) (citing a 1996
BNA study).
61. Mary Bernstein & John Mahoney, Management Perspectives on Alcoholism: The
Employer's Stake in Alcoholism Treatment, 4 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 223, 223 (1989) (reporting
that 40% of industrial fatalities and 47% of injuries are linked to alcohol).
62. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
MENTAL HEALTH STATISTiCS SOURCEBOOK 3 (Beatrice A. Rouse ed., 1995).
63. See Fred D. Hafer, PBS Online, The High Cost of Doing Nothing, at
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/closetohome/policy/htnd/hafer.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2002); see also
SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 45 (noting that substance abusers are
more likely to skip work and to switch jobs often).
64. These costs are further explored in the discussion of cost-effectiveness of treatment. See
infra Section II.D; see also HARWOOD ET AL., supra note 34, at 1-2 to -6 (stating that addiction
imposes societal costs through increased health expenditures, premature death, decreased
productivity, car crashes, crime, and increased entitlement spending).
65. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 70 (statement of Kenny Hall, Addiction Specialist,
Kaiser Permanente).
66. HARWOOD ET AL., supra note 34, at 4-31 to -33.
67. Id. at 1-3. This figure is in 1992 dollars.
68. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 18.
69. HARWOOD ET AL., supra note 34, at 1-1. This figure is also in 1992 dollars. Note that
inflation and population growth have a substantial effect on cost projections from year to year.
The authors of the NIH study estimated that substance abuse costs had increased 12.5% between
1992 and 1995 alone. Id. at 1-9.




One of the most intractable obstacles to insurance parity reform is the
widespread but inaccurate perception that addiction treatment is
ineffective. 0 In fact, studies show that treatment programs on average have
an effectiveness rate of 30-60%, if effectiveness is measured in terms of the
number of people who remain totally abstinent for one year or longer."
Individual treatment programs may achieve substantially higher abstinence
rates. The Partnership for Recovery, a coalition of top treatment centers,
cites success rates of 51-75%.72 In 1989, AMR Corporation, the parent
company of American Airlines, established an Employee Assistance
Program (EAP) that encompassed insurance parity. In testimony to
Congress, EAP manager John Saylor testified that AMR's program had a
75-80% success rate in keeping patients sober for a year or more.73
Moreover, a focus on total and permanent abstinence as the sole
measure of effectiveness is misplaced. Addiction is a "chronic, relapsing
disorder. Total abstinence for the rest of one's life is a relatively rare
outcome from a single treatment episode." 7 4 Viewed in this light, success is
marked by "a significant decrease in drug use and long periods of
abstinence." 5 When this more realistic measure of success is used, success
rates predictably increase; for example, the Hazelden Foundation boasts a
77% rate of keeping people "clean and sober" at the end of one year-54%
having remained completely abstinent, and the remainder having had just
one episode of use during that time. 6
Indeed, although addiction treatment is not by any means universally
successful, neither is treatment for many other conditions that are routinely
covered by health insurance. Addiction treatment has similar success rates
70. See Janet Firshein, PBS Online, Introduction, at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/closetohome/
treatment/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2002) (citing a study by the National Academy of
Sciences).
71. Id. (quoting Dr. Patricia Owen of the Hazelden Institute).
72. See House Hearings, supra note 7, at 54 (statement of R. Michael Conley, Chairman of
the Board of Trustees, Hazelden Foundation, on behalf of the Partnership for Recovery).
73. Substance Abuse: The Science of Addiction and Options for Treatment: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 62 (1998) (statement of John Saylor,
Manager of Employee Assistance Programs, AMR Corp.). The cost of complete treatment
averaged only $5000-6000 per patient, the majority uf whui tecived twcn'ty-nc-day ,npatent
care. Id. Similar success rates were reported by Mobil Corp. See Rimrock Found., A Corporate
Response to Alcohol and Drug Addiction, at http://www.rimrock.org/html/corporate.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2002) (citing the Mobil EAP's 70-85% success rate in avoiding relapse).
74. Leshner, supra note 30, at 46.
75. Id.; see also Substance Abuse: The Science of Addiction and Options for Treatment:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 34 (1998) (statement
of Dr. Robert Morse, Professor of Psychiatry, Mayo Medical School).
76. Letter from Michael Conley, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Hazelden Foundation, to
Representative John L. Mica (Nov. 12, 1999), reprinted in House Hearings,-supra note 7, at 97,
97.
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to those for treatment of hypertension, diabetes, and asthma.77 Indeed, one
study found that addiction treatment "ranked in the top 10 percent of
medical treatments reviewed for savings in money and lives." 7
D. Treatment Is Cost-Effective
Substance abuse treatment has a range of economic benefits for
patients, health insurers, employers, and society as a whole. These benefits
mean that investments in treatment more than pay for themselves.
Treatment coverage may even decrease total health care costs because the
cost of treatment is outweighed by decreases in other uses of the health care
system. A study of patients receiving publicly funded treatment in
Washington State found that five years after treatment, medical expenses
were cut in half relative to costs of those who were untreated.79
More likely, however, slight increases in premiums would result from
parity requirements, according to several recent studies. A study by RAND
Corporation economist Roland Sturm estimated that, as compared to no
coverage for treatment at all, unlimited addiction treatment coverage would
add $5.11 to premiums per plan subscriber per year." This amounts to a
premium increase of approximately 0.3%.81 The same study found that a
$10,000 treatment cap saves members only six cents per year (versus
unlimited coverage), while a $1000 cap saves $3.39 per year. 2 Even the
starkest of these differences, however, still amounts to less than fifty cents
per month. Similarly, an actuarial study by Milliman and Robertson, Inc.,
found that full and complete insurance parity provisions, if adopted
nationwide, would raise average nationwide premiums by less than 0.5%,
or less than one dollar per month; more limited parity provisions would
raise rates only 0.1%.83 Another actuarial study of provisions adopted by
77. See David McMaster, New Direction Needed in the Treatment of Alcohol Addiction, Wis.
ST. J., Aug. 13, 2000, at 2B.
78. Shift in Congress on Drug Policy Reform, supra note I (citing a Harvard School of Public
Health study).
79. Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, supra note 36, at 2, reprinted in House Hearings,
supra note 7, at 11.
80. Roland Sturm et al., How Expensive Are Unlimited Substance Abuse Benefits Under
Managed Care?, 26 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES & RES. 203, 206 (1999) (assessing the costs of
broad parity requirements to managed care plans).
81. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 64 (statement of Roland Sturm, Senior Economist,
RAND Corporation).
82. The reason the $10,000 cap saves so little is that only 1.3% of patients receiving
treatment for addiction in the study had total treatment costs above $10,000; more than half were
treated for $1000 or less. Sturm et al., supra note 80, at 207.
83. Stephen P. Melek & Bruce S. Pyenson, Milliman & Robertson, Inc., Premium Estimates
for Substance Abuse Parity Provisions for Commercial Health Insurance Products (1997),
http://www.health.org/workplace/insur/l.htm.
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some states found that full parity would raise premiums by only 0.2%.'
These estimates take into account only the cost of health insurance itself
and not other costs to employers and society as a whole.
Providing employees with access to addiction treatment saves
employers money in a variety of ways. A study by the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration determined that employees who
maintained sobriety for one year after inpatient treatment reduced
absenteeism by 85%, injuries by 50%, tardiness by 82%, and mistakes by
83%.85 Treatment for alcoholism demonstrably decreases behavioral
problems in the workplace.8 6
Individual employers' studies of their own programs support these
findings. For example, at one plant, Oldsmobile found that in the year after
undergoing treatment for alcoholism, disciplinary problems among its
employees declined by 63%, workplace accidents by 82%, absences by
56%, and total lost person-hours by 49%.87 Studies by the U.S. Navy and by
Illinois Bell found that treatment reduced sick leave by 46% and 51.1%,
respectively. 8 In addition, when treatment serves as an alternative to firing
employees whose work is impaired by addiction, it saves considerable
replacement costs, which for high-skill jobs can run up to $50,000 per
vacancy. 89 In total, Chevron estimates it receives a ten to one payoff on its
investment in treatment." ° General Motors estimates that its Employee
Assistance Program saves the company $37 million per year.9'
Society as a whole benefits financially from treatment programs as
well. The State of California estimates that its treatment program saved the
public seven dollars for every dollar spent.92 Crime was reduced by two-
thirds following treatment, and hospitalizations were reduced by one-
third.93 Other states' studies confirm significant reductions in crime rates
due to treatment.94 In terms of reducing crime, studies have found that
84. MERRILE SING ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE COSTS AND
EFFECTS OF PARITY FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE INSURANCE BENEFITS
(1998), http://www.mentalhealth.org/publications/allpubsfMc99-80/prtyfnix.asp.
85. See P'ship for Recovery, supra note 60.
86. Diana Chapman Walsh et al., Treating the Employed Alcoholic, 16 ALCOHOL HEALTH &
RES. WORLD 140, 147 (1992).
87. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 56 (statement of R. Michael Conley, Chairman of the
Board of Trustees, Hazelden Foundation, on behalf of the Partnership for Recovery).
00. Bvi-usiv-ln &X aUkJincy, supra Jnt. 1 t2
89. Rimrock Found., The Bottom Line, at http://www.rimrock.org/htmllinfolbottomline.htm
(ast visited Feb. 27, 2002).
90. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 56 (statement of R. Michael Conley, Chairman of the
Board of Trustees, Hazelden Foundation, on behalf of the Partnership for Recovery).
91. Id.
92. Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, supra note 36, at 3-4, reprinted in House Hearings,
supra note 7, at 12-13.
93. Id.
94. See P'ship for Recovery, supra note 37 (citing Minnesota and Arizona studies). The
Minnesota study showed a drastic reduction both in overall arrests and in DWI arrests. Id.
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treatment is substantially more effective than the criminal justice approach
taken in the war on drugs.9" Treatment also slows the spread of
HIV/AIDS.96 A federal study of five states' parity provisions concluded that
the provisions had little effect on premiums and any initial costs were offset
by savings to society.97 A RAND Corporation study found that providing
treatment for every addict in the United States would cost $21 billion, but
would save over $150 billion in social costs over fifteen years.98
Finally, insurance parity laws may help to make treatment even more
cost-effective and medically efficacious than it is already. Studies have
suggested that the lack of patients whose insurance fully covers addiction
treatment operates as a financial disincentive for pharmaceutical companies
developing improved treatments. Mandating parity would thus help to
stimulate private sector investment in research and development to bring
about cheaper and more effective treatments. 9 In addition, because
substance abuse is often correlated with mental health disorders, parity may
allow greater coordination of care that integrates the two concerns,
increasing efficiency and effectiveness."
E. Counterarguments
Although compelling, the case for insurance parity raises complex
ethical and practical questions. Opponents of insurance parity mandates
have raised a number of objections. In this Section, I consider and respond
to some of these, and to other potential problems with the case I have set
forth above.
1. The Voluntariness Argument
Some opponents of insurance parity have- argued that addiction is
different from other medical conditions because it stems ultimately from a
95. See, e.g., Janet Firshein, PBS Online, Our Current Policy, at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/
closetohome/policy/html/current.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2002) (citing a RAND Corporation
study finding treatment to be several times more effective in decreasing cocaine use than
imprisonment including mandatory minimum sentences).
96. Robert L. Hubbard, Evaluation and Treatment Outcome, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra
note 24, at 596, 603.
97. Physician Leadership on Nat'l Drug Policy, Position Paper on Drug Policy 4 (n.d.),
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 7, at 106, 109.
98. Janet Firshein, PBS Online, Does Treatment Work?, at http://www.pbs.orglwnet/
closetohomelpolicy/htmlltreatwork.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
99. See Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, supra note 36, at 2, reprinted in House
Hearings, supra note 7, at 11; Physician Leadership on Nat'l Drug Policy, supra note 97, at 1,
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 7, at 106.
100. See House Hearings, supra note 7, at 66 (statement of Roland Sturm, Senior Economist,
RAND Corporation). Mental health treatment is already subject to parity requirements. See infra
note 205 and accompanying text.
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choice to engage in unhealthy and socially undesirable behavior."" The
common perception of alcohol and drug addiction as self-inflicted
conditions accounts in large part for the social stigma that attaches to them,
as I discuss further below. This perception is largely unjust; addiction is a
disease with a documented biological mechanism. Tendencies toward
addiction may also have a genetic component, which further undercuts the
idea of voluntariness.1
0 2
Nonetheless, addiction undeniably has an underlying behavioral basis,
and the initial behavior that triggers a cycle of addiction is generally
voluntary. An individual may be genetically predisposed toward
alcoholism, but she cannot become an alcoholic without ever taking a drink.
This element of voluntariness may affect our assessment of whether those
who suffer from addiction are morally or legally entitled to consideration
analogous to that accorded to victims of other diseases.
In defense of insurance discrimination against addiction treatment,
then, one could argue that the point of health insurance is to protect people
from harms inflicted by chance, or at least by factors outside their control.
Insurance is about spreading risk, not spreading the costs of self-inflicted
injuries. When a person chooses to drink or use drugs, perhaps she assumes
the risk of becoming addicted. Therefore, she should not expect sympathy
or solicitude from society if that risk is actualized.'03 To take this analysis a
step further, perhaps to cast drug and alcohol users as "victims" of
addiction is misleading or even dangerous, because it strips away a sense of
personal responsibility for their actions. Under this view, those who choose
to drink or use drugs should pay the consequences.
For several reasons, however, the behavioral choice element of
addiction does not justify insurance discrimination. As an initial matter, of
course, the issue of moral responsibility and desert does not particularly
bear on the bulk of the policy argument for insurance parity that I have laid
out above. The social and economic costs of untreated addiction are an
independent justification for insurance parity regardless of what we may
think about whether addicts in some way "deserve" treatment. The
majority of the costs of untreated addiction are, in fact, borne by persons
101. See House Hearings, supra note 7, at 36 (statement of Rep. Barr) (stating that "a lot of
people choose to use" drugs and alcohol); cf id. at 33 (statement of Rep. Hutchison) (raising this
argument as a possible objection to insurance parity, although not clearly endorsing it).
102. See supra Section l.A.
103. Cf. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 50-51, 57-72 (1995) (noting that voluntariness of a risk may legitimately be understood
to discount its magnitude in risk analysis). But cf. Frank B. Cross, The Subtle Vices Behind
Environmental Values, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 151, 160-69 (1997) (critiquing the value of
the voluntary/involuntary distinction in risk analysis).
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other than the addicts themselves: family members, employers, and society
as a whole. 1" 4
Second, the rationale that illnesses caused in part by voluntary conduct
should not be covered by health insurance appears disingenuous, or at least
hollow, when applied solely to addiction as opposed to other diseases.
Many diseases that are routinely covered by health insurance stem at least
in part from behavioral choices. The great majority of emphysema cases
and a huge portion of lung cancer cases can be traced to cigarette smoking,
which also increases the risk of a litany of other health harms.'0 5 Many
illnesses, including heart disease, high blood pressure, and diabetes, are
heavily influenced by "lifestyle" factors such as diet and exercise." 6 Also,
accidents are frequently the fault of those who are injured in them.
But it is not within the realm of serious discussion to suggest that health
insurers should exclude coverage for all these conditions just because they
have a behavioral component. A vision of "personal responsibility"
extended to such a degree would probably be considered heartless by most
Americans. Most of us recognize that people sometimes make lifestyle
choices that are in some way unhealthy: We drive too fast, or we smoke, or
we do not exercise enough, or we eat too many carbohydrates. Why, then,
single out addiction for the type of moral condemnation implied by the
voluntariness argument? To deny treatment to drug and alcohol addicts on
the basis, essentially, that they have committed a moral wrong or chosen
their own fates is not only uncompassionate but also unjust, because it
places a staggering burden on a group of people on the basis of an
extremely arbitrary distinction between addiction and other behaviorally
induced diseases.
Third, the specific behaviors that can eventually give rise to
addiction--drug and alcohol use-are or have been engaged in by many,
many more Americans than eventually become addicted.0 7 In the case of
alcohol use, the behavior is not even one that mainstream society
condemns. Quantity of use clearly impacts the chance of becoming
addicted, but there are many heavy users who do not become addicted. Use
of drugs or alcohol is thus a necessary but not a sufficient factor in causing
addiction. Genetic predisposition and unchosen life-history factors like
104. See HARWOOD ET AL., supra note 34, at 7-1 (stating that the nonabusing population
bears at least fifty-six percent of the cost of drug abuse and fifty-five percent of the cost of
alcoholism).
105. As Philip Morris publicly declared in late 1999: "'There is an overwhelming medical
and scientific consensus that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, and
other serious diseases in smokers."' Philip Morris Admits Tobacco Linked to Cancer, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 13, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File (quoting the
company website).
106. See, e.g., Heart Association Dietary Guidelines, HARV. HEART LETTER, Feb. 1, 1997,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Harvard Heart Letter File.
107. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 7.
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physical or sexual abuse may play important roles.'18 Addicts are to some
degree victims not just of their own deeds, but of some measure of bad
luck. Given this fact, the instinct to blame the addict seems particularly
arbitrary and unfair. Why should addicts alone be condemned-or, at least,
alone bear the practical costs of this condemnation-when other users are
not? The difference between the two groups of people is not that one group
engages in a particular behavior while the other does not. Rather, it is
simply that one, unlike the other, suffers from a disease. The underlying
hypocrisy behind the blame-the-addict approach is most apparent with
respect to alcohol, a product that is used openly and without shame by most
adult Americans. The stigma of addiction thus does not attach merely to the
behaviors giving rise to the illness, but to the illness itself. The alcoholic is
viewed in some way as weak-that is, not capable of "handling" a
substance that so many others have the ability to enjoy casually.' 09
Finally, the use of personal responsibility arguments to justify health
insurance discrimination is particularly problematic, because addicts who
seek treatment have, in most cases, made a decision to terminate their self-
destructive behavior. Given the nature of the brain disease of addiction,"'
the difficulty of coming to and then following through on this decision
should not be underestimated. The voluntariness argument endorses
denying access to treatment to someone who is trying to take responsibility
for their behavior in the face of an overwhelming biological compulsion, on
the basis that he or she should be held responsible for past behavior. The
concept of personal responsibility this reflects is harsh, unforgiving, and
ultimately self-defeating.
2. The Illegality Argument
Another objection to insurance parity runs as follows: Even if requiring
treatment for alcohol addiction is justifiable, addiction to illegal drugs
stems from a decision to break the law. Requiring insurers to provide drug
users with treatment rewards lawbreaking and is inconsistent with
legislatures' and society's decision to condemn this behavior."'
108. See supra Section H.A.
109. See Luisa Dillner, When Life Is Just Poured Away..., GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 17,
1996, at T4 (quoting a statement of Moira Plant of Edinburgh University that alcoholics are
stigmatized as having "weak personalities").
110. See supra Section Il.A.
111. Cf House Hearings, supro note 7, at 46 (statement of Rep. Barr). Representative Barr
stated:
[Removing] the moral component[] completely may not be the best way to cast this
argument, because we do want to send a message to people that alcohol is bad and the
use of drugs is bad, and not to say, well, it is OK, and we can't have any stigma at all
attached to it.
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The argument that drug addicts have chosen to break the law is in some
ways tied to the issue of voluntariness and individual responsibility, and to
that extent one may respond to this criticism with many of the same
arguments outlined above. First, treatment coverage brings social and
economic benefits that do not hinge on the legality of substance use.
Second, a large percentage of Americans admit to having used illegal drugs
at some point in their lives,1"2 but relatively few become addicted. Third, it
may be counterproductive to cite individual responsibility as a reason to
deny treatment to addicts who have made the responsible and difficult
choice to end their use of illegal drugs. Yet there is something to the
"illegality argument" beyond the culpability of the individual addict. From
a broader perspective, perhaps one could argue that requiring employers
and insurers to bear the costs of treatment for illegal drug use is inconsistent
with the overall logic of a legal system in which that drug use is a crime. As
a practical matter, perhaps guaranteeing addicts access to drug treatment
undercuts the central message of the so-called war on drugs: Drug use is a
criminal act that has criminal consequences.
Clearly, this objection begs the question of whether drug use should, in
fact, be considered a crime. This question is much too complex, and too
much of a digression, to be addressed here; countless scholars and
advocates have explored it thoroughly and insightfully."' Naturally, if one
believes that drug prohibition is misguided or wrong, then one's views on
insurance discrimination are unlikely to be swayed by an argument that
relies on the internal logic of the drug war. Yet one need not start with this
belief in order to conclude that insurance parity is morally and legally
justified. Therefore, I will take as given two assumptions: that the use of
certain drugs is and will remain illegal, and that, as a society, we wish to
discourage the use of these drugs. Nonetheless, the current prevalence of
health insurance discrimination against drug addicts must be seen in the
context of broader drug policy; regardless of the validity of arguments for
Id. Note that Representative Barr's argument does not rely on illegality per se, but simply on the
validity of attaching stigma to behaviors that society wants to condemn; he applies the argument
to alcohol use as well.
112. According to Dr. Alan Leshner, director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, "70
million adult Americans have used an illegal drug at some point in their lives." Alan I. Leshner,
Take the Stigma Out of Addiction, FAM. PRAC. NEWS, Aug. 15, 2000, at 9, LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Family Practice News File.
113. See, e.g., AFTER PROHIBITION: AN ADULT APPROACH TO DRUG POLICIES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (Timothy Lynch ed., 2000) (collecting essays debating issues related to drug
legalization); STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING
OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993); JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE
FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS
(2001); HARM REDUCTION: PRAGMATIC STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH-RISK BEHAVIORS
(G. Alan Marlatt ed., 1998) [hereinafter HARM REDUCTION] (collecting essays discussing "harm
reduction," an alternative to current drug policy that would deemphasize criminal law
enforcement in favor of efforts to alleviate the negative consequences of drug use).
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drug legalization per se, this discrimination is one of the disturbing excesses
of modem America's drug war.
One response to the illegality argument is that regardless of what social
sanctions we wish to attach to illegal drug use, the health insurance system
is not the appropriate venue for those sanctions to be enacted. Decisions
about the scope of health insurance coverage should be based on medical
science and, as a secondary factor, cost-effectiveness. Questions about
criminality belong to the sphere of criminal justice, which should properly
remain separate from medical and actuarial decisionmaking. The criminal
justice system sets certain penalties for drug use, and it provides procedural
protections to the accused. Denial of access to medical treatment because of
insurance discrimination, if conceived of as a punishment for drug use, is
punishment that goes beyond those penalties prescribed by the criminal law
and is administered without those procedural protections. In this sense, it is
unfair to the "punished" addict, and it also distorts the objectives of the
medical system by making it a tool of the criminal justice system.
Finally, the illegality argument raises the question of what, exactly, the
drug war is supposed to achieve. If the goal is reducing drug use-as
opposed to supporting the political exigencies of tough-on-drugs
politicians-then it is hard to see the justification for denying access to
medical treatment for drug addiction. The goal of treatment, after all, is to
terminate drug use. And treatment is demonstrably effective in reducing or
terminating drug use-more so than criminal law enforcement."14 It would
be a sad irony if the characterization of addicts as criminals-one aspect of
the stigma addicts face-actually served as a justification for denying them
the opportunity to end the very behavior that is illegal.
3. Free Market Arguments
The category of "free market arguments" against insurance parity
mandates includes several distinct but interrelated objections. The first set
of these objections holds that the assessment of the medical value and cost-
effectiveness of different forms of medical treatment is a responsibility best
performed by health insurers themselves, who perform countless such
assessments as a routine aspect of their business, or by the employers and
individuals who select insurance plans with their own best interests in mind.
Such an argument might be pragmatic-that is, market actors will actually
make better decisions than the government will-or philosophical,
grounded in a libertarian, laissez-faire political theory that emphasizes
individual choice. In testimony against the Substance Abuse Treatment
114. See Firshein, supra note 95.
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Parity Act, a representative of Americans for Tax Reform highlighted both
aspects of this argument:
[T]he American people ought to be free to decide what they want in
their health policy coverage. If they want substance abuse treatment
coverage in their health policies, they can buy it in the marketplace.
Insurers will be more than happy to provide the coverage the
market demands....
... [A] central planning approach is neither efficient nor does it
have the proper respect for the freedom of choice that the American
people should have."'
Another type of free market argument suggests that the significant
coverage gaps that currently exist belie the supposed cost-effectiveness of
insurance parity. That is, if addiction treatment really were so cost-
effective, insurers and employers would choose to cover it voluntarily.
Surely they would not simply ignore dramatic potential savings."1 6 The fact
that they have not covered treatment suggests that these savings do not
exist. This argument is tied to a fourth, pragmatic formulation-that
government mandates for health insurance coverage necessarily increase
premiums and thereby increase the number of uninsured Americans by
making health insurance less affordable."7 This claim is the central
argument of the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), the
major insurance industry lobbying group, in opposition to the Substance
Abuse Treatment Parity Act." 8
The issue of whether the government should mandate insurance parity
is complex in part because of the basic nature of the insurance industry.
Health insurance plans cannot possibly cover all forms of medical treatment
for all conditions. Some treatments are, for example, astronomically
expensive or lack medical value. In order to keep premiums within the
economic reach of most Americans, insurers must make some tough
choices. Also, employers are able to assess the specific needs of their
employees and the economic requirements of their business when they
design compensation packages. Maybe, then, insurance professionals and
employers are best suited to make these decisions, and the government
should not interfere. Perhaps, even, requiring parity for treatment of a
115. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 81 (statement of Peter J. Ferrara, General Counsel and
Chief Economist, Americans for Tax Reform).
116. Id. at 82.
117. Id. at 81.
118. Id. at 85 (statement of Charles N. Kahn III, President, Health Insurance Association of
America).
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particular illness would set a precedent for excessive government
entanglement in a business that is best left to the free market.
In response, it should first be noted that government-mandated
requirements for insurance coverage of addiction treatment would not lack
precedent; a number of laws currently constrain the coverage decisions of
insurers and employers. To cite a few examples, federal law already
requires mental health treatment parity," 9 many state laws require private
insurance plans to cover oral contraceptives, 2 ' and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act 2' limits employers' ability to exclude maternity care
from health insurance policies.'22 Indeed, the HIAA's concern about
increased premiums appears to be linked not so much to the specific content
of a substance abuse treatment parity mandate, but rather to the cumulative
effect of many coverage mandates, most of which already exist.13 As
HIAA notes, " [T]he number of State mandates has increased twenty-five
fold during the last two decades." 24 Against this background, concerns that
substance abuse parity provisions would set a bad precedent or entangle the
government in an area that is currently left to the free market seem off-base.
The government routinely regulates the health insurance business.
Second, strong medical and economic evidence, discussed in Sections
II.C and II.D above, suggests that the free market simply is not working.
Employers and insurers for the most part continue to offer plans that cap
insurance coverage for addiction treatment in ways that do not make
economic sense. The disparity between what the studies on cost-
effectiveness say should be done and what employers and insurers actually
do, however, is so stark that it may demand an explanation in addition to
correction. That is, it is worth asking why, if the studies are correct, the
insurance coverage picture remains so bleak.
119. Mental Health Parity Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-5 (West Supp. 2001).
120. See Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care
System: Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 189 (1999) (reviewing state laws).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
122. See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L.
REV. 363, 376-83 (1998).
123. HIAA's president conceded as much in his testimony, asking rhetorically, "[l1n
isolation, who can argue against coverage for substance abuse?" House Hearings, supra note 7, at
86 (statement of Charles N. Kahn III, President, Health Insurance Association of America). Kahn
d ica s-UU at.5LJI u h~ LLLU
insurance premiums by an average of nine percent. Id. at 91. Subsequent committee debate
challenged this finding. First, Representative Ramstad noted that that study, which was funded by
HIAA itself, was inconsistent with the consensus of other studies. Id. at 101 (statement of Rep.
Ramstad). Second, initial premium increases may have resulted from the effect of pent-up
demand. In Kaiser Permanente's experience, many people who had never had access to treatment
sought it in the program's first year. Once that demand leveled out, cost savings became more
apparent. Id. at 95 (colloquy between Rep. Mica and Kenny Hall, Addiction Specialist, Kaiser
Permanente).
124. Id. at 91 (statement of Charles N. Kahn III, President, Health Insurance Association of
America).
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Drug and alcohol addicts face an extraordinary degree of social stigma
that may prejudice even those employers and insurers who are generally
attempting to engage in objective, profit-driven decisionmaking. Studies
document the prevalence of these attitudes among the general public. 2 ' In
introducing the Fairness in Treatment Act of 2001 (discussed below in Part
IV), Senator Paul Wellstone stated the problem eloquently:
For too long... addiction has been viewed as a moral issue, rather
than as a disease. Too often, a cloak of secrecy has surrounded this
problem, causing people who have this disease to feel ashamed and
afraid to seek treatment for their symptoms for fear that they will be
seen as admitting to a moral failure, or a weakness in character. We
have all seen portrayals of alcoholics and addicts that are intended
to be humorous or derogatory, and only reinforce the biases .... I
cannot imagine this type of portrayal of someone who has another
kind of chronic illness.1
26
Stigma persists notwithstanding the existence and publication of
scientific evidence demonstrating the nature of addiction as a brain disease.
Dr. Alan Leshner of the National Institute on Drug Abuse explains that
there is a "dramatic lag" between advances in scientific knowledge and
public perception of those advances. 127 This is true as a general rule, but it is
especially true in the case of addiction because of the common perception
of addicts as "weak or bad people, unwilling to lead moral lives and to
control their behavior." 128
The problem of stigma is compounded by market failure. The economic
decisions of HMOs and other insurers do not take into account the full
range of costs addiction imposes on employers and society at large: lost
productivity, absenteeism, replacement costs, accidents, and so forth." 9 In
determining whether a service is cost-effective, insurers consider only
whether it will decrease medical costs overall: Is the cost of the service
itself outweighed by its benefits in preventing costlier health problems in
the future? Although the studies cited above in Section II.D demonstrate
125. Survey Reveals Bias Against Recovering Alcoholics and Addicts, ALCOHOL & DRUG
ABUSE WKLY., Dec. 20, 1999, at 3 (demonstrating public unwillingness to hire recovering
addicts).
126. 147 CONG. REC. S2732 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
127. Leshner, supra note 30, at 45.
128. Id.
129. Of course, if these costs translated into increased demand for treatment coverage among
employers purchasing health care plans, insurers might well adjust the plans they offer in order to
meet that demand. In doing so, they would be indirectly accounting for the range of costs
addiction imposes on employers. But because employers themselves do not properly account for
the costs of addiction and the savings brought by treatment, see infra notes 133-136 and
accompanying text, this demand-driven market pressure is absent, and insurers have no reason to
internalize these costs. Furthermore, insurers never have an economic incentive to factor in costs
imposed on third parties-that is, on society as a whole.
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quite conclusively that coverage of treatment saves money for employers
and for society as a whole, they do not demonstrate that covering treatment
saves money on medical costs alone. Rather, using premium rates as an
index of total medical costs, most studies find that covering addiction
treatment would raise medical costs by a very small but appreciable margin
(raising premiums, in one study, by half of one percent). The overall cost
savings come from non-health-care factors, such as increased productivity.
In the highly competitive insurance industry, individual insurance
companies may lose customers by raising their premiums by even a small
amount. This risk is considerably amplified by the adverse selection
problem, which is well documented in the literature on health care
reform."3 ° Insurance companies, like all businesses, respond to customer
demand. Given the choice between one plan that covers addiction treatment
and another, slightly cheaper plan that does not, which customers are likely
to choose which? For people with no personal or family experience with
addiction, choosing a plan with no coverage of addiction treatment makes
economic sense. Thus, the only people who pick a plan that covers
treatment are those who are probably more likely to need it.13
This adverse selection tendency triggers a vicious cycle: Premiums for
the plan covering treatment increase more because the population they
cover is likelier than the average population to need treatment. Moreover,
addicts suffer more than nonaddicts from a range of other health
complications, which greatly worsens the adverse selection spiral; health
insurance for a less healthy population is simply more expensive. Because
adverse selection results from individual choice in a competitive market, a
solution is government regulation-making it mandatory for all plans to
cover treatment.
32
Employers internalize some costs that insurers do not, such as
absenteeism, accidents, and lost productivity. The studies cited above
130. See, e.g., Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74
B.U. L. REV. 109, 133, 140 (1994) (explaining adverse selection).
131. Adverse selection is likely to be a lesser problem in the employer-provided group health
plan market than in the individual health insurance market, since the risk pool is averaged across
all employees of that employer. See Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Perspective on Benefits: Humpty
Dumpty Health Insurance, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1999, at B9 (noting that the employer-provided
health insurance system is designed to avoid adverse selection). Nonetheless, adverse selection is
broadly considered aeous pro min heath insrance, even though mnt in- rnee i. nrovided
by employers. See Richard G. Frank et al., Solutions for Adverse Selection in Behavioral Health
Care, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv., Mar. 22, 1996, at 109 (noting that adverse selection is a
particular problem with regard to pricing coverage of mental health treatment). Possible
explanations include the following: Some employers offer individual employees choices between
particular plans; for small or mid-sized employers, risk-pooling may not be sufficient; and for
employers who do not self-insure, costs of medical plans are affected by the adverse selection that
occurs among individual purchasers who are in the market for the same plans.
132. Cf Toni Vranjes, Doctor Proposes Major Changes in Health Insurance System, MED.
INDUSTRY TODAY, Jan. 19, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Medical Industry Today File (reporting
Dr. David Levy's stance that standardizing coverage is the best solution to adverse selection).
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demonstrate that when these costs are included, addiction treatment
coverage becomes clearly cost-effective. Therefore, a rational employer
purchasing a group insurance policy should demand broader coverage of
addiction even at the cost of slightly higher premiums. But employers may
not always act rationally; they are influenced by longstanding
misconceptions both about the nature of addiction and about the
effectiveness of treatment. Some employers may view it as easier simply to
fire an employee rather than deal with her need for substance abuse
treatment. In some cases involving low-skilled workers in a tight job
market, this may actually be true, but in the great majority of jobs, worker
replacement costs alone outweigh even the total cost of treatment.
133
Furthermore, firing probably makes the addict's chances for recovery even
worse, amplifying the personal and social costs of addiction; many studies
show that unemployment increases substance abuse rates and decreases the
chance that treatment, even if it is accessible, will be effective. 134
Stigma, along with inadequate medical information and failure to
internalize relevant costs, may therefore explain the origins of coverage
inequalities; it is also a factor impeding reform. In the political climate
fostered by the drug war, politicians may be afraid to support pro-treatment
policies for fear that they will be labeled "soft on drugs." Furthermore, the
stigma associated with addiction has impeded the development of pro-
treatment social and political movements.135 Addicts, notwithstanding their
large numbers and prevalence in every sector of society, are a relatively
politically powerless group, lacking the lobbying might to move legislation.
According to William McColl of the National Association of Alcoholism
and Drug Abuse Counselors, "[N]o one is stepping up and speaking out, so
we haven't tapped into the potential power of people saying 'this is a
problem for us.' 136
Finally, even if all the studies demonstrating that addiction treatment
coverage is cost-efficient for employers were wrong, a coverage mandate
would still be justified. This is true even strictly from an economic costs
perspective, provided that all costs to society are taken into account. Just as
employers internalize some costs that insurance companies do not,
government internalizes some costs that employers do not. As discussed in
Sections H.C and I.D, the costs of substance abuse, and the savings from
treatment, extend beyond the employment realm. These costs include, for
example, increased domestic violence, child abuse and neglect, and other
133. See supra Section l.D.
134. See Kenneth Silverman & Elias Robles, Employment as a Drug Abuse Treatment
Intervention: A Behavioral Economic Analysis, in THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANCE USE
AND ABUSE 279, 279-81 (Frank J. Chaloupka et al. eds., 1999) (reviewing these studies).
135. See Firshein, supra note 8.
136. Id.
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crimes; automobile and other accidents; spread of infectious disease; and
increased federal and state entitlement spending. Moreover, in addition to
the quantifiable financial costs, addiction causes great suffering for its
victims and their families. A humane and compassionate government policy
ought to take these consequences into account; the complex ethical
considerations surrounding health insurance policy cannot ultimately be
reduced to a simple calculus of cost-efficiency.
On balance, the case for parity in insurance coverage of addiction
treatment is strong. Treatment saves money and lives, and can help
recovering addicts avoid tremendous suffering. Because of the large
existing coverage gaps, recovery advocates need to look at legislative and
litigative options for encouraging change. The remainder of this Note
assesses some of these options. I begin by analyzing the currently most
effective federal law protecting those who suffer from addiction, the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
III. EMPLOYERS' OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act, passed in 1990, is landmark civil
rights legislation restricting disability-based discrimination in employment,
government services, and public accommodations.' Drug and alcohol
addictions are disabilities under the ADA. This interpretation of the ADA
stems from longstanding precedent under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, the ADA's antecedent legislation covering discrimination by recipients
of federal funds.'38 The legislative history of the ADA clearly points to an
assumption that addiction would be covered, and courts applying the ADA
have recognized its application to the disability of addiction.'39 Drug
addiction and alcoholism are specifically listed as "physical or mental
impairments" in the ADA implementing regulations passed by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)."4  The ADA, however,
provides no protection for current users of illegal drugs; it does cover
alcoholics and drug addicts who are already in recovery."' This exclusion
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
138. Kenneth Vanko, Note, in Search of Common round: Leveting iw r-laying "" .i.. ..
Chemically Dependent Workers Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 1996 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1257, 1261.
139. See, e.g., Hoffman v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155
(D. Conn. 2001) (stating that "drug and alcohol addiction satisfies the disability prong" of the
ADA); Thompson v. Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp., No. C-94-4015, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4781, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1996) ("Drug addiction and alcoholism are protected
disabilities under the ADA.").
140. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (2001).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12114; see also Hoffman, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 155 (rejecting an ADA claim
because the plaintiff was a drug user at the time of dismissal). One scholar has suggested that
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might be understood to reflect Congress's adherence to the "illegality
argument," discussed above in Subsection II.E.2, or a simple reluctance to
be seen as soft on drug users.
Moreover, according to the EEOC, disability-based discrimination in
employer-provided health insurance plans is prohibited by the ADA. In its
1993 implementation guidance on the application of the ADA to health
insurance, the EEOC stated that its ADA implementation regulations
explicitly covered discrimination in "fringe benefits," and that application
to insurance benefits was specifically contemplated in section 501(c) of the
Act. 142 The EEOC further noted that this application also prevents
employers from discriminating in hiring: "[D]ecisions about the
employment of an individual with a disability cannot be motivated by
concerns about the impact of the individual's disability on the employer's
health insurance plan." '43 Finally, "insurance offices" are also defined as
"places of public accommodation" under Title III of the ADA.'"
At least in theory, then, the ADA may prohibit some types of insurance
discrimination against addiction treatment. This theory has not been tested
by litigation. A realistic assessment of other strands of ADA jurisprudence,
however, suggests that courts are increasingly reluctant to scrutinize closely
the content of insurance policies, and that advocates pursuing an ADA
claim may face an uphill battle.
A. Overview of ADA Litigation Strategies
A challenge to disability-based discrimination in private health
insurance might proceed under Title I or Title Ell of the ADA.'45 Title I
governs employment discrimination, and Title III governs discrimination in
public accommodations. Title I would only apply to situations where the
challenged health insurance policy is provided by an employer, although
courts often wrongly extend this exception to current users of alcohol. Amy Hennen, Protecting
Addicts in the Employment Arena: Charting a Course Toward Tolerance, 15 LAW & INEQ. 157,
172-73 (1997) (arguing also that the current-drug-use exception should be abolished).
142. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Interim Enforcement Guidance on the
Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to Disability-Based Distinctions in Employer-
Provided Health Insurance, EEOC Notice 915.002, at 2-3 (June 8, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC
Guidance on Health Insurance]. The EEOC's implementation regulations are found at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 (2001). Section 501(c) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c), provides some guidance as to
which disability-based distinctions in health insurance are acceptable; these are discussed further
in Section III.B.
143. EEOC Guidance on Health Insurance, supra note 142, at 3.
144. Id.
145. Lawsuits against government employers or government health plans might also proceed
under Title II, which covers government services. Cf Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524
(D. Md. 1996) (allowing a Title 1 lawsuit against the state for failing to place mental patients in
community-based care facilities). The standards involved in Title 11 litigation are similar to those
in Title I cases; I therefore do not discuss Title II in detail here.
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the lawsuit could be brought either against the employer or against the
employer-contracted health insurance company directly. 46 In contrast, a
Title III lawsuit alleging that the provision of health insurance is a "public
accommodation" would be brought directly against the health insurance
company.147 Title III is thus a potential strategy for challenging health plans
that are not employer-provided.
Title I of the ADA prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against
a qualified individual with a disability in... compensation... and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 148 This provision
prohibits direct, disparate-treatment-type discrimination. So, for example,
an employer may not refuse to hire a person because she is wheelchair-
bound, unless her disability prevents her from performing the tasks of the
job satisfactorily. In addition, however, Title I places upon employers the
affirmative responsibility to provide "reasonable accommodations" for
employees' disabilities.'49 An employer must make any adjustments in the
working environment (including the physical facilities) that are reasonably
necessary to enable a disabled employee to do the job. An employer is not
required to provide an accommodation if to do so would cause "undue
hardship" (an affirmative defense)."0
Challenges to disability-based distinctions in insurance coverage have
generally been framed as disparate treatment claims, and a Title I challenge
to substance abuse treatment limitations could readily proceed along the
same lines. A Title III claim would be similar, but rather than alleging
discrimination in the compensation, terms, and conditions of employment,
the claimant would argue that the health insurance company has an
obligation to provide services in a manner that does not discriminate based
on disability. The argument would be that the company's choice to provide
146. See David Manoogian, With Suits Mounting, Courts Face the Question of Whether a
Managed Care Organization Can Be an Employer Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 17, 1997, at B6 (stating that managed care organizations and other health
insurers can be sued under Title I because they are "'organization[s] providing fringe benefits to
an employee of a covered entity." (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(2))); see also Carparts
Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that managed care organizations are "employers" under the ADA). Manoogian notes
that in the case of a bankrupt employer, a plaintiff might look directly to the insurance company to
satisfy a judgment. Generally, however, the employer would probably be ultimately liable for
discrimination on the part of the insurance companies witti which it contracts. As the EEOC
states, "[An employer will be liable for any discrimination resulting from a contract or agreement
with an insurance company... to provide or administer a health insurance plan on behalf of its
employees." EEOC Guidance on Health Insurance, supra note 142, at 2-3.
147. Manoogian, supra note 146.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
149. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
150. Id. See generally U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Enforcement
Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice 915.002 (Mar. 1, 1999) [hereinafter EEOC Reasonable
Accommodation Guidance].
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less coverage for substance abuse treatment disadvantages those customers
who suffer from the disability of addiction. This constitutes discrimination
in "places of public accommodation," a term defined in Title III to include
insurance offices.'51
B. Legitimacy of Some Disability-Based Distinctions: ADA Section 501(c)
Not all distinctions in health care coverage based on disabilities are
illegal. Health insurers, in fact, are in the business of making just such
distinctions. In setting the scope of health benefits, insurers routinely
distinguish among ailments, many of which constitute "disabilities" under
the ADA. The question, then, is how to determine whether a distinction is
legitimate and not discriminatory. Section 501(c) of the ADA provides
some guidance.' 52
Section 501(c) provides a safe harbor from the ADA's requirements. It
explicitly permits employers and insurers to make disability-based
distinctions in health insurance plans under two conditions. First, the
distinction must be "bona fide" -it must be based on "underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not
inconsistent with State law." "' This criterion is not strict; it essentially
requires the health plan to prove that it is a real, existing, benefits-paying
plan that is legally organized under applicable state law.154 The heart of the
section 501(c) inquiry is the second condition: The distinction in question
must not be a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADA]." '55
According to the EEOC, "subterfuge" is defined as "disability-based
disparate treatment that is not justified by the risks or costs associated with
the disability."156 This cost-benefit analysis is conducted by courts on a
case-by-case basis.'57 The employer has the burden of proving that the
distinction is not a subterfuge. There are several ways the employer might
prove this. First, it could argue that the distinction is "justified by
legitimate actuarial data... and that conditions with comparable actuarial
data and/or experience are treated in the same fashion." "' Second, it could
argue that to eliminate the distinction-to provide the requested coverage-
would be financially catastrophic, either causing the health plan to become
insolvent or causing a "drastic" change in premiums or cutback in the
remainder of the plan. Third, it could argue that the treatment in question
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
152. Id. § 12201(c).
153. Id. § 12201(c)(2).
154. EEOC Guidance on Health Insurance, supra note 142, at 4.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
156. EEOC Guidance on Health Insurance, supra note 142, at 12.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 13.
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can be shown by "reliable scientific evidence" to have "no medical
value." 159
The second and third of these arguments are not plausible in the
addiction treatment context. Even if addiction treatment were not cost-
effective---contrary to the evidence discussed above-it is inconceivable
that the costs could be enough to cause insolvency or "drastic" premium
increases. The best estimates place premium increases at less than 0.5%, 60
which is much less than any reasonable interpretation of "drastic."
Furthermore, even the most pessimistic assessments of addiction
treatment's effectiveness do not suggest that it has absolutely "no medical
value" -- even a thirty percent success rate would far exceed those of many
commonly available types of medical treatment.
The first argument outlined above-that the distinction is consistent
with actuarial data-is more complicated because it requires a close
analysis of the particular plan in question. The crux of the issue is, is
addiction treatment covered to a lesser extent than are comparably effective
medical treatments for comparably severe conditions? The answer to this
question is usually yes; many plaintiffs should be able to show (and it
would be the employer's burden to disprove) that substance abuse treatment
is singled out for discriminatory limitations. This singling out demonstrates
that the disability-based distinction is a subterfuge, and therefore the section
501(c) exception to the ADA's requirements should not apply.
C. Courts' Differing Approaches: The Mental Health and AIDS Cap Cases
In recent years, federal courts have set some criteria for determining the
legitimacy of disability-based distinctions in health insurance coverage,
mostly in cases involving challenges to caps on coverage of AIDS-related
or mental health conditions. 6' These cases involve limits on annual or
lifetime insurance payments for AIDS-related or mental health conditions
that do not apply to payments for other conditions. "AIDS caps," which
were until recently common, are closely analogous to the provisions of
most insurance plans regarding substance abuse treatment. Mental health
caps were also common, but have been directly outlawed by the Mental
Health Parity Act of 1996.62 ADA challenges to both types of cap have
proceeded under Titles , T!. and 111.
159. Id. at 14.
160. See supra Section II.D.
161. The EEOC, faced with a case overload and needing to prioritize its enforcement actions,
has placed considerable emphasis on the eradication of AIDS discrimination, including
discrimination in health insurance. See Manoogian, supra note 146.
162. Pub. L. No. 104-204, tit. VII, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 30 0 gg-5 (West Supp. 2001)).
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The EEOC has clearly stated that it believes that AIDS caps are
presumptively illegal under the ADA. 6 3 Nonetheless, many courts have
disagreed. The first federal court of appeals to consider the issue was the
First Circuit in Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England.t 64 In Carparts, the district court had
rejected Title I and Title III challenges to an AIDS cap. The appeals court
reversed and remanded on both issues, but its holdings were ambiguous as
to the legality of the AIDS cap. On the Title I issue, the First Circuit held
that the district court had used the wrong interpretation of the term
"employer" in holding that an insurance plan was not an employer under
the ADA. The appeals court instead followed the more expansive
interpretation of "employer" found in case law interpreting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,16 and remanded to the district court to determine
whether an insurance company fell within that definition.1 66 Under this
interpretation, an employer is "any party who significantly affects access of
any individual to employment opportunities," regardless of whether that
party would have been considered an employer at common law.167 In the
Title VII context, that interpretation has been held to encompass benefit
program administrators. 
168
Turning to the ADA Title IlI claim, the Carparts court considered the
issue of whether an insurance company could be a "place of public
accommodation" even if it did not have a concrete physical structure like a
store. The court declined to make more than a "threshold" ruling on this
issue, but noted that the statutory language was ambiguous and that the
legislative history demonstrated that Congress contemplated application to
service companies that lacked "definite physical boundaries."' 6 9 It
remanded the case to the district court for further consideration and noted
that the factual elements of the Title III claim were as yet poorly developed
in that case. On remand, the district court denied the defendants' motions
for summary judgment on both the Title I and the Title III claims. 7 '
163. EEOC Guidance on Health Insurance, supra note 142, at 8-9. Note that the EEOC's
interpretive guidances, "'while not controlling on the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance.'' Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944))).
164. 37 F.3d 12 (st Cir. 1994).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
166. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 21.
167. Id. at 17 (citing a Title VII case, Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d
1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982)).
168. Barone v. Hackett, 602 F. Supp. 481,483 (D.R.I. 1984).
169. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18 (quoting, but rejecting, the district court's criterion).
170. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 987 F. Supp.
77, 78 (D.N.H. 1997).
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Notwithstanding these ambiguities, it is probably fair to read Carparts
to stand for two main propositions, both favorable to plaintiffs. First,
because insurance companies may be considered "employers" under Title
I, victims of discrimination in insurance coverage may sue the insurers
directly rather than suing their actual employers. Second, an insurance
company, even one without a discrete "office" in which the discrimination
took place, is a "place of public accommodation" under Title III. Note that
neither of these holdings addresses the substantive issue of whether an
AIDS cap constitutes disability discrimination under the ADA.
The Sixth Circuit came closer to resolving this question in the mental
health cap context in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.'7' The
Sixth Circuit panel held that discrimination in long-term disability
insurance coverage was encompassed by the "place of public
accommodation" provision of Title III, even though the plaintiff did not
actually physically go to an insurance office. It went on to consider whether
the mental health cap was a legitimate disability-based distinction or a
"subterfuge" under the section 501(c) safe harbor provision. The panel
reversed the district court's holding that "subterfuge" required an intent to
discriminate, and held instead that subterfuge was simply a policy criterion
that was "based on speculation, and not on sound actuarial principles,
actual or reasonably anticipated experience, or bona fide risk
classification." 72 It remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the policy met this definition of "subterfuge."
The Parker case, however, never reached the stage of applying that
definition. The Sixth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and
proceeded to reverse the panel holding in an 8-6 decision.'73 Specifically,
the en banc court held that for the "place of public accommodation"
requirement of Title III to be met, plaintiffs would need to have physically
visited the office of the insurance company to request coverage. Thus, the
court held that there was no Title III violation and that therefore the issue of
the section 501(c) safe harbor was irrelevant. 74 The panel decision,
including the discussion of the interpretation of "subterfuge," was vacated.
The Parker court went further, stating in dicta that the mental health
cap did not actually discriminate because the same benefits package was
offered to disabled and nondisabled employees. Because employees without
mental illness were also for mental health tratme-nt, nn
171. 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en bane). For a
discussion of the content of the vacated decision, see Kristin Kay Romero, Defining
Discrimination in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.: Determining if a Health Insurance
Policy's AIDS Benefit Cap Violates the ADA, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 179 (2000).
172. Parker, 99 F.3d at 192.
173. Parker, 121 F.3d 1006.
174. Section 501(c) provides an exception to the ADA, and therefore only applies if an ADA
violation is found.
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discrimination occurred even though only the disabled employees would
actually have needed treatment. 7 ' The court cited the Seventh Circuit's
decision in EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos., which followed a similar
rationale with respect to limitations on mental health coverage in long-term
disability insurance plans.'76 The court in CNA Insurance had cited the need
to abstain from making a controversial ruling on insurance parity at the time
that the Mental Health Parity Act was debated in Congress.'77 The main
difference between CNA Insurance and Parker is that CNA Insurance was
an interpretation of Title I, not Title III. The Third and Fourth Circuits
subsequently made similar decisions in other cases involving mental health
treatment limitations.1
78
The main dissent in Parker, joined by five judges, criticized the
majority for ignoring legislative history that clearly showed an intent to
encompass the content of health insurance policies, an intent reflected in the
adoption of section 501(c) that the majority's interpretation would make
largely irrelevant.'79 A separate dissent by Chief Judge Martin noted that the
"purpose of Title III is to 'bring individuals with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of American life"'-a purpose that is
inconsistent with the artificial, overly technical approach taken by the
majority.8 0 This criticism was directed at the majority's interpretation of
the "place of accommodation" language, but it is equally applicable to the
majority's dicta regarding the substantive issue of whether discrimination
occurred. The Parker-CNA Insurance approach is wholly artificial; it is true
but irrelevant that people who do not need mental health benefits are also
deprived of them. This approach relies on the flawed assumption that the
goal of antidiscrimination law is always like treatment, even in unlike
cases. The ADA-which, after all, defines the failure to provide special
accommodations as discrimination-rejected this narrow view in favor of a
more realistic vision of what is necessary to level the playing field for
disabled Americans.
The Seventh Circuit raised further barriers to ADA challenges to
insurance coverage limitations in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,
175. Parker, 121 F.3dat 1015-17.
176. 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1997).
177. Id. at 1044. That Act was passed the day before the release of the CNA Insurance
opinion, but covered only health insurance, not long-term disability assistance. See Parker, 121
F.3d at 1017-18.
178. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying analysis similar
to Parker's to Title I, and also holding that Title III did not apply because Congress intended Title
I to be the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination); Rogers v. Dep't of Health & Envtl.
Control, 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999) (involving an ADA Title II claim related to government
health benefits).
179. 121 F.3d at 1020-22 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1020 (Martin, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto.
Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-
485, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,382)).
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an AIDS cap case.' Chief Judge Posner's majority opinion held that Title
III, in general, does not reach the content of goods or services provided at a
place of public accommodation. Specifically, so long as the same benefits
package is available to all consumers, the ADA does not oblige an
insurance company to provide any particular set of benefits. The court
analogized the plaintiff's claim to a blind person's demand that a particular
store sell books in Braille, or a one-legged person's complaint about a shoe
store only selling shoes by the pair. 2 The court concluded, "Had Congress
purposed to impose so enormous a burden on the retail sector of the
economy and so vast a supervisory responsibility on the federal courts, we
think it would have made its intention clearer." 83
The Second Circuit, in Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co., explicitly
rejected the Seventh Circuit approach.' Citing the First Circuit's decision
in Carparts, the court held that Title III must be understood to extend to the
content of health insurance policies in order to effectuate Congress's
"'clear and comprehensive national mandate"' against disability-based
discrimination in all aspects of social and economic life. 8
181. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
182. Id. at 559-60. In my opinion, this analogy is flawed. ADA analysis always turns on the
reasonableness of a particular requirement and the burden it imposes-that is, a balancing of
competing interests. A shoe store could likely show easily that the hypothetical single-shoe
requirement would not be a "reasonable modification" or that it would "fundamentally alter" the
nature of its business, while an insurance company-at least in the context of treatments that are
proven to be cost-effective-likely could not make such a showing. For a discussion of reasonable
accommodation requirements, see infra Section lI.D. Mutual of Omaha has occasioned some
scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA's Impact on Health
Care for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REv. 51, 84 (2000); Romero, supra note 171, at
191.
183. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 560. The Mutual of Omaha court further held that an
application of the ADA to the content of insurance policies would be inconsistent with another
federal statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act. id. at 563. That Act directs courts not to interpret
federal statutes in a way that would conflict with state regulation of the insurance industry unless
the federal statute "specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
Because a section 501(c) analysis requires an inquiry into the actuarial soundness of the insurance
policy, the court reasoned that it would substantially interfere with the work of state insurance
commissioners and would thereby violate the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
In my view, inconsistency with the McCarran-Ferguson Act can only be found through
extremely circular reasoning, since the very portion of the ADA that would require potential
interference with state regulators-section 501(c)-clearly does "specifically relate to the
business of insurance." The court gets around this objection by saying that the part of the Act that
requires interpretation is section 302(a). not section 501(c). and that section 302(a) does not
directly mention insurance. This is simply question-begging, however, since section 302(a) also
does not require any interference with state administrators. The court separates the two portions of
the Act for the purpose of determining whether the Act "specifically relates to the business of
insurance," but conflates them for the purpose of determining whether they interfere with state
administration of the insurance industry. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 564.
184. 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999).
185. Id. at 33 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994)). Furthermore, the court held that the
legislative histories and purposes of the ADA and the McCarran-Ferguson Act demonstrated no
conflict between the two. McCarran-Ferguson was intended to prevent "inadvertent" federal
intrusions on the field of insurance regulation; multiple specific references to insurance in the
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The rationales of the Sixth Circuit in Parker and the Seventh Circuit in
Mutual of Omaha are applicable only to Title III suits against insurance
companies. The problem in Title III litigation arises from the issue of what
constitutes a "place" of public accommodation. Title I has no such
language, and its ban on discrimination in the "terms and conditions of
employment" seems clearly to extend to the content of benefits packages.
Employees may therefore still be able to sue their employers under Title I.
In addition to CNA Insurance in the Seventh Circuit, however, recent
precedents in other circuits cast substantial doubt on whether the Title I
option remains viable, at least outside the First Circuit, in which Carparts
remains good law as to both Title I and Title III. In Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., the Third Circuit followed the rationale in CNA Insurance
and Parker that no discrimination could have occurred where every
employee "had the opportunity to join the same plan" and therefore
received "equal treatment." 116 A previous Eighth Circuit opinion had
applied a similar rationale to insurance caps on fertility treatment." 7 Similar
decisions were subsequently reached in the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits.'88
As Parker demonstrates, the substantive issue is basically the same
under both Titles I and III: Does the provision of facially equal benefits to
differently situated persons constitute discrimination? Recent trends
demonstrate that under both Titles, courts are increasingly answering that
question in the negative. The First Circuit remains a holdout, although even
it has not resolved the substantive question but has simply removed some
procedural bars to ADA challenges.
D. Assessment of ADA Litigation Potential in Addiction Treatment Cases
Although the circuits remain split to some extent, and some have not
yet ruled on these issues, there is a decided trend among courts of appeals
to reject ADA challenges to disability-based distinctions in health
insurance, regardless of whether they arise from Title I, Title II (in
government employment situations), or Title IIl. This is an unfortunate
ADA demonstrate that the intrusion was not inadvertent but was clearly intended by Congress. Id.
at 34-35.
186. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601,608 (3d Cir. 1998).
187. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
188. EEOC v. Staten Island Say. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2000); Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116-18 (9th Cir. 2000); Kimber v. Thiokol
Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 1999); Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 170 (4th
Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit's decision in Staten Island Savings Bank, though it applied only to
Title I, suggests that notwithstanding the encouraging precedent of Pallozzi, courts in the Second
Circuit will not likely uphold plaintiffs' claims under Title Ill either. Pallozzi never reached the
question of whether the insurance plan actually was discriminatory; under the rationale of Staten
Island Savings Bank, it probably would not be. Staten Island Say. Bank, 207 F.3d 144.
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development. CNA Insurance and its progeny represent an artificial and
overly formalistic view of equality that has no place in the interpretation of
the ADA, which was designed as a "transformative statute, requiring not
only formal equality, as the non-discrimination concept had traditionally
been understood, but also structural equality-the accommodation of
difference." '89 The ADA was not designed to enforce the principle that
people with different needs must all be treated the same-quite the
opposite. A better interpretation of the ADA, one more faithful to its
purpose, would require not that all employees be offered the same benefits
packages, but rather that the benefits packages they are offered be
structured in a way that realizes the statute's vision of true equality.
The situation presented by the insurance cap cases is this: Two
employees, one suffering from a disability and the other not, are both
presented with an insurance plan that limits or excludes coverage for that
particular disability. For the disabled employee, this is a tremendous
limitation, one with enormous life consequences that may prevent her from
effectively doing her job. For the nondisabled employee, the limitation is
totally insignificant. In what meaningful sense can this insurance plan be
said to treat the two employees equally? For one the insurance plan is
sufficient, and for the other it is grossly inadequate, with the distinction
solely based on disability.
Ultimately, the statutory plan of the ADA offers a way out of this
dilemma: Nondiscrimination under the ADA means that the employer must
either provide benefits that meet the reasonable needs of all employees, or
provide special accommodations for its disabled employees-in this case, a
different insurance plan. The CNA Insurance line retreats from this vision
of a broader equality mandate in favor of the limited antidiscrimination
principle the ADA was designed to transform. In fairness to the courts,
perhaps this development is due to the pleadings of the litigants, who
appear to have framed their claims as simple allegations of disparate
treatment. 190 Future litigants should consider moving beyond this strategy.
Two specific clauses of Title I's definition of "discrimination"
explicitly go beyond the formal equal treatment principle. Subsection
102(b)(3) prohibits "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of
administration.., that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of
disability." '' Subsection 102(b)(5)(A) requires that employers make
-reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
189. Linda H. Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3
(2000).
190. Judging by the absence of any mention in the decisions of the various courts, reasonable
accommodation does not seem to have been raised as an issue in any of the insurance cap cases.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (1994).
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of an otherwise qualified individual," unless such accommodations would
impose an "undue hardship" on the employer.1 9 2 Title III contains a similar
disparate impact prohibition and also states that places of public
accommodation must make "reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures" when they are "necessary" to afford access to
goods and services to disabled individuals, unless such modification would
"fundamentally alter" the nature of the goods and services.193 I discuss
reasonable accommodation here, but similar analysis could apply to Title
III's reasonable modification clause.
The existing challenges to disability-based insurance caps have not
been crafted explicitly as disparate impact challenges or as requests for
reasonable accommodation. A challenge that was so crafted might have a
better chance of success. 94 Nonetheless, it may prove difficult to persuade
courts to bring insurance and other benefits within the rubric of "reasonable
accommodation," where they have not traditionally been found.
Reasonable accommodation encompasses only those changes necessary to
enable the employee to perform the job.'95 Benefits are typically understood
to be outside this spectrum for logical reasons; the question of
compensation is different from the question of job performance. In the case
of substance abuse treatment, however, litigants in some cases may be able
to prove that receiving treatment is necessary to enable them to perform the
duties of the job. Such a conclusion would be consistent with existing case
law, although the accommodation required by courts to date has been
limited to matters such as sufficient leave time to obtain treatment on one's
own, and has not extended to treatment funding.196 If they can further prove
that health insurance coverage is necessary to enable them to obtain that
treatment, they may be entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the
192. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
193. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
194. See Keith Nelson, Comment, Legislative and Judicial Solutions for Mental Health
Parity: S. 543, Reasonable Accommodation, and an Individualized Remedy Under Title I of the
ADA, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 91 (2001) (proposing strategies for reasonable accommodation lawsuits
in mental health cap cases).
195. Wendy E. Parmet et al., Accommodating Vulnerabilities to Environmental Tobacco
Smoke: A Prism for Understanding the ADA, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 20 (1997-1998).
196. Most existing ADA cases involving addiction have focused on what reasonable
accommodations employers are required to provide to current or recovering addicts. Courts have
held that employers are required to provide unpaid leave and reasonable adjustments in working
hours in order to allow employees to take part in outpatient or inpatient treatment programs. See
EEOC Reasonable Accommodation Guidance, supra note 150, at 26 (stating that reasonable
accommodation includes unpaid leave for substance abuse treatment). Courts have usually held
that employers may, in fact, make an employee's participation in treatment mandatory as a
condition of continued employment-they may offer a firm choice between treatment or
dismissal. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989). The issue of "forced
accommodation" is complex and has occasioned some criticism from legal scholars. See, e.g.,
Tim Edwards, Constitutional Limits on an Employer's Right To Dictate the Terms of an Addict's
Recovery Under the ADA: Some Sobering Concerns, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1679 (1999). I do not
focus on that issue here, however, since it is not germane to the insurance discrimination issue.
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ADA. Alternatively, the employer could simply be required to pay for the
treatment directly. Such an interpretation seems eminently reasonable and
consistent with the nuanced notion of equality embodied by the ADA.
In any event, regardless of the potential of reasonable accommodation
lawsuits in particular cases, they do not provide a broad solution to the
problem of insurance discrimination against addiction treatment. The nature
of reasonable accommodation is piecemeal-a particular employee gets a
specific accommodation tailored to her interests. A court's finding that a
reasonable accommodation was required for a specific employee would do
nothing to change the employer's health insurance plan obligations toward
the rest of its employees-health plans could continue to impose
discriminatory benefit caps. Case-by-case litigation is an inherently
inefficient way to achieve change, and it ensures that parity will only be
provided to those plaintiffs who are able to meet the complicated
requirements of the ADA on an individualized fact assessment.
Furthermore, for a reasonable accommodation cause of action to lie, the
plaintiff must formally request such accommodation from the employer and
be denied. In many instances, addicts seeking treatment may not wish to
make such a request because of privacy concerns.'97
Although ADA suits always turn on individualized facts, disparate
impact litigation may hold the potential to bring about a broader remedy
than would disparate treatment suits. Under Title I's disparate impact
clause, a plaintiff would have to show that the defendant utilized
"standards, criteria, or methods of administration... that have the effect of
discrimination on the basis of disability." 198 A holding that a given health
insurance policy disparately impacted a disabled plaintiff might require that
the policy itself be changed, rather than that the individual plaintiff simply
be accommodated. It might require parity. Only qualified employees with
disabilities under the meaning of the ADA, however, would have standing
to challenge a company's failure to provide this parity.
Beyond the issues raised in the existing AIDS and mental health cap
cases, there remain a number of hurdles for substance abuse treatment
advocates to overcome in pursuing ADA litigation. For one thing, none of
these cases has yet reached the substantive issue of what constitutes a
legitimate actuarial decision by insurance companies as opposed to a
suhterflgo,. This is an issue that may prove to be complex and require
extensive factual scrutiny-a task in which courts may be reluctant to
197. This, of course, presents a problem for any parity strategy that relies on case-by-case
litigation for its enforcement. If parity were required in all cases, however-under a clear
statutory requirement with which employers' insurance companies would rather comply than lose
litigation-an addicted employee would be able to seek treatment without notifying her employer,
and retain her privacy to the extent that all medical records remain confidential.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3).
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engage. Furthermore, no court has yet applied these precedents to addiction
treatment, which may raise another issue: Plaintiffs will have to show that
substance abuse treatment caps are, in fact, a disability-based distinction.
Showing that addiction is a disability is fairly straightforward, given
existing case law.'" Not every person who seeks treatment for substance
abuse, however, is necessarily an addict.2" Some may have substance abuse
problems that fall short of the statutory definition of a disability. There is no
case law defining substance abuse itself as a disability.
Indeed, it may be that the determination of whether an individual
claimant has a disability will be highly individualized regardless of whether
that claimant is actually an addict. The ADA defines a disability as "(a) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of [an] individual; (b) a record of such an impairment;
or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment." 2 01 Courts determine
whether this definition is met on a case-by-case basis, rather than
identifying whole classes of ailments that count as disabilities per se.O2° An
individual litigant (addict or not) who is suffering from a substance abuse
problem has to show that the condition substantially limits one or more
major life activities, while a person in recovery has to provide similar
evidence of a past impairment.
Thus, although the best interpretation of the ADA would find a
violation in some cases of insurance discrimination against addiction
treatment, the trend in recent case law offers a fairly daunting, though not
hopeless, outlook for advocates. Moreover, ADA cases are generally an
uphill battle for plaintiffs, and courts are becoming increasingly hostile.
Employers have won ninety-two percent of all ADA cases that have made it
to court, and countless others have not made it that far.203 The Supreme
Court has begun to circumscribe the reach of the ADA as a whole by, for




And, of course, the ADA provides no remedy for those who currently suffer
from addiction to illegal drugs, because of the specific exception built into
the law. Therefore, even if the courts interpret the ADA's application to
health insurance policies in the ways advocated here, recovery advocates
will need to think about new strategies beyond the ADA.
199. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 6 (discussing the distinction between substance abuse and addiction).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
202. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999).
203. Kevin Harris, Disability, American Style, CONVERIUM, Oct. 1, 1999,
http://www.converium.com/.
204. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment bars damage awards in ADA suits against unconsenting state governments).
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IV. ALTERNATIVES: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
A. Provisions and Advantages of Current Legislative Proposals
for Substance Abuse Treatment Parity
In 1996, Congress passed the Mental Health Parity Act, which
mandated insurance parity for mental health treatment, but excluded
substance abuse treatment."' In the wake of this law, the Substance Abuse
Treatment Parity Act was first introduced in 1997 and reintroduced in each
subsequent Congress (1999 and 2001). The most recent version of the bill is
called Fairness in Treatment: The Drug and Alcohol Recovery Act of 2001
in the Senate, 2 6 and the Harold Hughes-Bill Emerson Substance Abuse
Treatment Parity Act of 2001 in the House."7 Both were introduced in
March 2001; as of April 2002, the Senate bill had five cosponsors and the
House bill had thirty-nine."'
The Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act would apply to all group
health plans, not just to those provided by employers. As its name implies,
its fundamental requirement is parity for substance abuse treatment. The
Act does not require insurance plans to cover addiction treatment. Rather, it
forbids plans that do cover addiction to impose discriminatory limitations
on that coverage that do not apply to other conditions.2" The bill exempts
employers with fewer than fifty employees. The House version of the bill
also exempts employers who would incur a premium increase of more than
one percent by complying with the Act.210
Another bill currently pending in the House would have similar effects,
although it would not include the one percent premium increase cap. In
2001, Representative Marge Roukema reintroduced amendments to the
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 first introduced in 1998 that would,
among other changes, expand the legislation to include substance abuse
treatment."' The functional effect on addiction coverage would be similar
to that of the Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act because that bill is in
turn modeled on the Mental Health Parity Act. Representative Roukema's
205. Mental Health Parity Act, Pub. L. No. 104-204, tit. VII, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996) (codified
as amended at42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-5 (West Supp. 2001)).
206. S. 595. 107th Cong. (2001). To avoid confusion, I refer to both the House and the Senate
versions of this bill as the Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act.
207. H.R. 1194, 107th Cong. (2001).
208. The bill's status is tracked at Partnership for Recovery, at http://www.capwiz.comV
pfr/issues/bills/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2002). By the end of the 105th Congress, the 1997 bill had
ninety-one cosponsors in the House, but never reached a floor vote. Lexis-Nexis Congressional
Universe: Bill Tracking, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2002).
209. S. 595, sec. 2, § 2707(a).
210. H.R. 1194, sec. 3, § 9813(c)(2).
211. Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity Amendments of 2001, HR. 162, 107th
Cong. (2001).
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bill, however, contains substantially less detail regarding its application to
substance abuse specifically-for example, what benefits are covered. No
analogous legislation has been introduced in the Senate. 2  Nonetheless, this
bill seems to be gaining strength in the House; in March 2002 it had 202
cosponsors, suggesting that its passage in the future is a strong
possibility." 3 The analysis in the following Section focuses mostly on the
Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act, because of that bill's greater level
of detail, but it is applicable to both proposals unless otherwise noted.
Both bills appear to apply a fairly broad parity standard to substance
abuse treatment generally. This is commendable, although some
clarification as to what treatments are covered may be necessary."' In any
case, either insurance parity bill would represent an important step toward
eradicating insurance discrimination against people who suffer from
addiction. The fundamental concept of parity recognizes that addiction is a
disease like any other and should be treated accordingly. It is because it
captures the basic spirit of fairness that parity has become the focal point, in
terms of federal lobbying efforts, of the recovery movement." 5 If passed,
these bills will probably enable a large number of people to acquire
treatment that might otherwise have been inaccessible.
212. See Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness and the Emergence of
Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REv. 8, 20 (2000) (discussing the original
amendments); Nat'l Ass'n of Social Workers, Update on Mental Health Parity (Dec. 20, 2001), at
http://www.naswdc.orgladvocacylupdates/l122001.htm (describing the current state of the bill and
Senate legislation reauthorizing the Mental Health Parity Act but not applying it to substance
abuse).
213. See Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress: H.R. 162, at http://thomas.loc.gov
(last visited Mar. 13, 2002) (tracking the number of cosponsors).
214. In particular, any insurance parity legislation that is passed should include coverage for
methadone maintenance treatment, a medication-based therapy that, although politically
controversial, is by far the most effective treatment for heroin addiction. See Joyce H. Lowinson
et a]., Methadone Maintenance, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 24, at 550, 556-57 (stating that
methadone maintenance significantly reduces heroin use, decreasing crime and increasing
productive employment of patients); Susan F. Tapert et al., Harm Reduction Strategies for Illicit
Substance Use and Abuse, in HARM REDUCTION, supra note 113, at 145, 152, 154-60 (stating that
methadone, though controversial, is effective in eliminating heroin use, reducing crime, increasing
health, and reducing HIV infection). The version of the Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act
introduced in the House in 1999 appeared to exclude methadone by specifying that only
"abstinence-based" services were covered, a term that was defined to encompass "non-narcotic
medication-based therapy and appropriate transitional medication-based therapy." H.R. 1977,
106th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(A) (1999). Fortunately, the version of the Act introduced in the House in
2001 does not include the "abstinence-based" language, H.R. 1194, and the language was never
in the Senate version, see Field Has Busy Legislative Agenda; Does Congress Have the Time?,
ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY., Jan. 3, 2000, at 1, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Alcoholism &
Drug Abuse Weekly File. In any event, the current version of the Substance Abuse Treatment
Parity Act is fairly vague as to what treatments arc covered, and the Mental Health and Substance
Abuse Parity Amendments of 2001 are even more so. Further clarification may be necessary to
avoid ambiguity in interpretation.
215. See, for example, the emphasis placed on the Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act on
the website of the Partnership for Recovery, a coalition of prestigious nonprofit treatment
providers. P'ship for Recovery, at http://www.partnershipforrecovery.org (last visited Mar. 13,
2002).
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B. Shortcomings
Although an important first step toward filling the gap in coverage of
addiction treatment, the Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act has a
number of serious limitations that are the products of political compromise.
These limitations may facilitate passage of the Act, but they will hamper its
effectiveness to some extent. First, the Act does not require any employer
or health plan to provide addiction treatment benefits in the first place.
Rather, it simply mandates that if they do provide such benefits, plans
cannot place monetary or other limits on them that do not apply to medical
benefits generally. Thus, it would become illegal to cap substance abuse
coverage at $5000 (unless all medical benefits had the same cap), but it
would remain perfectly legal to exclude coverage entirely. Essentially, the
worst plans in terms of parity are excluded from the Act's requirements.
This limitation may actually be less serious than it appears. The great
majority of insurance plans currently do provide some coverage of
substance abuse treatment--only with capped benefits-meaning that the
provisions of the Act would apply to them. There is a danger, however, that
the Act would create a perverse incentive for companies to slash treatment
benefits entirely rather than increase them to the levels required by the
parity principle. Although the extent to which this would take place is
completely speculative, the danger that some employees would wind up
worse off is a good reason to eliminate this loophole.
Second, the Act exempts employers with fewer than fifty employees.
This is a serious limitation because most large businesses already provide
addiction treatment coverage; it is small and mid-size businesses that do
not. Although other antidiscrimination statutes also tend to exempt small
businesses, the cutoff is generally lower: fifteen employees.216 The small
business exemption was put into the bill as a political compromise.217 There
are significant political obstacles to the imposition of any form of
regulatory burden on small businesses, some of which are grounded in
economic arguments that make some intuitive sense. Small businesses are
less able to absorb the cost of regulatory changes; they cannot realize
certain economies of scale (such as the creation of a self-administered EAP,
which requires substantial resources within the company). They also do not
have the inhpre.nt ahility tO sprend ri-k that large businesses do. That is,
suppose on average one in every twenty-five employees requires substance
abuse treatment at some point. A company employing 400 people will have
216. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (1994) (exempting
employers with fewer than fifteen employees); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (same).
217. See House Hearings, supra note 7, at 34 (statement of Rep. Ramstad) (stating that the
exemption was needed "to get the bill moving").
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to treat sixteen, on average; if they are unlucky, they may have to treat
twenty or even twenty-five, but there is unlikely to be a huge statistical
aberration over such a large sample size. In a company with fifteen
employees, however, the sample size is low, and it is certainly possible that
the company will have to treat two or three employees, at a cost that may
impose a serious financial burden.
Although these concerns are serious as applied generally to regulation
of small businesses, there are at least two reasons why they do not justify
excluding small businesses from the requirements of the Substance Abuse
Treatment Parity Act. First, as discussed in Section II.D, a number of
studies demonstrate substantial overall cost savings to businesses as a result
of increased investment in substance abuse treatment. Larger businesses
may benefit more from treatment coverage due to economies of scale and
greater bargaining leverage in the insurance market, which may allow them
to expand coverage less expensively. Still, the magnitude of the positive
returns is so great that it seems impossible that small businesses would not
also benefit."' In small businesses as well as large, employees who undergo
treatment are dramatically more productive, healthier, and less likely to
have accidents or take sick and injury leave than are untreated addicts. The
fifteen-person business with three people who need treatment may therefore
benefit the most from insurance parity.219
The second reason that the small business exemption is illogical relates
to the basic purpose of the legislation: insurance parity. Every argument
regarding the burden the Act places on small businesses can be applied to
insurance coverage generally; for this reason, small businesses are less
likely than large ones to provide health insurance benefits in the first place.
Compared to the cost of treating many other medical conditions, addiction
treatment is a bargain, even if the small business ignores its long-term
benefits. A fifteen-person company that had to cover three employees, or
218. See supra Section II.D (citing payoff ratios of up to ten to one). Although
comprehensive studies focusing solely on small businesses are lacking, there is some evidence of
cost savings among small businesses that have provided coverage of substance abuse treatment.
For example, a study of hospitality industry employees, including employees of small businesses,
showed reductions in injuries, tardiness, absenteeism, and errors following treatment. See House
Hearings, supra note 7, at 57 (statement of R. Michael Conley, Chairman of the Board of
Trustees, Hazelden Foundation, on behalf of the Partnership for Recovery); cf. Rimrock Found.,
Recovery from Alcohol and Drug Addiction: A Role for Small Business, at
http:/lwww.rimrock.org/html/role.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2002); Rimrock Found., Addiction
Treatment: A Small Business Investment with Unique Dividends, at http://www.rimrock.org/
htmllinvestment.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
219. Naturally, this raises the question of why treatment coverage should be made mandatory
when it is in the businesses' self-interest; economic rationality ought to dictate that they provide
coverage voluntarily. This issue is discussed above in Subsection Il.E.3. Business decisions are
not always purely rational; they may be skewed by social stigma or misinformation about
treatment's benefits and effectiveness.
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even one, for cancer treatment would be in tremendous trouble."0 The
Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act does not mandate that businesses
provide health insurance, nor does it prevent them from placing annual or
lifetime caps on health benefits. (The wisdom of such employer mandates is
the subject of a much broader debate over health care reform.) Rather, it
simply states that in whatever coverage employers do provide, they cannot
discriminate against substance abuse treatment. If a small business can
absorb the cost of providing comprehensive insurance coverage for
hundreds of other conditions, many of which are more costly than
addiction, there is no reason the cost of covering substance abuse treatment
would be uniquely prohibitive. Insurance parity is a very modest
requirement, economically speaking; it demands only fairness.
Another problematic limitation on the Act's scope is a catchall
provision that exempts any employers that would incur a premium increase
of at least one percent if they complied with the Act. This attempt to
minimize the Act's economic impact by legislative fiat, in theory, ought to
be largely irrelevant. If the studies supporting adoption of the Act are
correct, companies should be able to provide insurance parity for less than a
one percent increase in premiums."' Nonetheless, the loophole is
potentially worrisome because it allows for creative accounting. Companies
know they are off the hook if they make cost projections that exceed one
percent, so they have a perverse incentive to look for the least cost-effective
plans-which they will then never have to adopt. Furthermore, it should be
noted that if this provision is adopted, it would make the small business
exemption wholly unnecessary, as any small business facing substantial
cost increases would be exempted anyway.
The amendments to the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 introduced by
Representative Roukema would avoid this problem with the Substance
Abuse Treatment Parity Act. The Mental Health Parity Act includes the
same one percent increase cap. 2 ' The Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Parity Amendments would abolish this cap in addition to expanding the
Mental Health Parity Act to include substance abuse treatment.223 Thus, this
proposal would solve this problem with the Substance Abuse Treatment
Parity Act, although it would still not solve the other flaws outlined here.
220. Obviously, this is why small businesses do not self-insure (as many large companies do)
but instead buy into large insurance plans, if they provide insurance at all; it spreads the risk
beyond the company itself. Still, a small business with one or two cancer patients may abruptly
find its group premium rate hiked by the insurance company. This is a serious problem that may
necessitate comprehensive health insurance reform, which is beyond the scope of this Note.
221. See, e.g., Melek & Pyenson, supra note 83.
222. Pub. L. No. 104-204, sec. 702, § 712(c)(2), 110 Stat. 2944, 2947 (1996) (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-5(c)(2) (West Supp. 2001)).
223. Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity Amendments of 2001, H.R. 162, 107th
Cong. (2001).
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Drug and alcohol addiction are common diseases that cause untold
suffering in the United States each year, suffering that is exacerbated by the
stigma and discrimination currently embedded in our social, economic, and
legal structure. Simply providing access to medical treatment for these
diseases could help to alleviate a large measure of this suffering.
Encouraging treatment would also have significant economic and social
benefits in terms of increased productivity; decreased absenteeism;
decreased crime, accidents, and health care costs; and more intact families.
Sadly, for the great majority of Americans, proper treatment is inaccessible
because of inadequacies in health insurance coverage. Even though most
health insurance plans nominally cover addiction treatment, almost all limit
that coverage with an array of payment caps and other constraints that do
not apply to treatment for other diseases. This is discrimination, pure and
simple. The medical establishment has long since recognized the nature of
addiction as a brain disease and the necessity for effective forms of
treatment. Public perceptions may, ever so slowly, be starting to change.
The time has come to make addiction treatment accessible, and the first step
toward increased access must be parity in insurance coverage.
Because most insurance policies are provided by employers, lack of
insurance parity is an employment discrimination issue. The Americans
with Disabilities Act provides recovery advocates with one possible
litigation strategy, both against employers and against insurance companies
as "public accommodations." I conclude that, at least in many cases, the
ADA should be interpreted to prohibit the caps on substance abuse
coverage that pervade most insurance policies. Addiction is a disability, and
the failure to treat addiction like analogous diseases constitutes
discrimination on the basis of this disability, in particular if discrimination
is understood to encompass policies with disparate impact or failure to
provide reasonable accommodations for addicts. The federal courts have yet
to hear ADA lawsuits to achieve parity in insurance coverage for substance
abuse. Unfortunately, however, the courts have been increasingly
unfriendly toward other litigation challenging various disability-based
distinctions in insurance policies. Different litigation strategies might bring
more success, but the task is formidable.
Ultimately, both the courts' intransigence and the inherent limitations
of the ADA-for example, the exemption of current drug users and the
piecemeal nature of case-by-case litigation-mean that a true solution to
insurance discrimination demands legislative change. Two currently
pending bills, the Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Act of 2001 and the
Mental Health and Substance Abuse Treatment Parity Amendments of
2001, provide potential solutions. Passing such legislation is an essential
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first step toward the achievement of parity, and Congress should do so
without delay. Yet, certain limitations will hamper these bills'
effectiveness, and advocates at both the federal and state levels should press
for broader legislation. This legislation should apply to small as well as
large employers, should mandate that addiction treatment be covered by
any plan that covers treatment for diseases of similar severity, should
clearly cover all medically effective forms of treatment including
methadone maintenance, and should not contain loopholes insulating
employers from any possible premium increases.
Recovery advocates should be creative in the search for solutions to the
shortfall in insurance coverage of addiction treatment. Employer-provided
health insurance is not the only solution; treatment could be funded through
other private or public means. In fact, because of the public savings that
treatment brings-for example, decreased crime, increased productivity,
and decreased accidents-public funding of addiction treatment for the
uninsured is justifiable based on cost alone. 4 On the other hand, a
comprehensive funding effort may be politically implausible on the national
level. National drug treatment programs, despite being long cited as a
priority by politicians, remain woefully underfunded.2 5
While working for change in the legal system, advocates naturally
should not forget that change can sometimes be brought about more quickly
through education campaigns and social activism. Businesses are affected
by prevalent social stigma, but they are also fundamentally self-interested
creatures. They can be, and many have been, convinced to adopt parity in
their own insurance plans simply on the ground that in the long run it will
save them a lot of money. Advocates should work to change
misconceptions about the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of treatment
and to transform the public misconception that addicts are criminals or
derelicts who have brought their conditions on themselves by choice.
Addiction is a serious disease, and its victims deserve understanding,
respect, and compassion; they also deserve access to effective medical
treatment. In the end, it is a question of simple fairness.
224. See supra Section I.D.
225. See Pamela L. Simmons, Solving the Nation's Drug Problem: Drug Courts Signal a
Move Toward Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 35 GONZ. L. REv. 237, 251 (2000) (noting that even a
modest 14.3% increase in treatment funding proposed by President Clinton in 1994 proved
politically impossible, due to politicians' belief that treatment is perceived as soft on crime).
Despite this inadequacy, governments actually bear the lion's share of the cost of treatment today,
since private funding is even more lacking. Two-thirds of funding for addiction treatment today
comes from federal, state, and local governments, while only fourteen percent is provided by
private insurance. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, supra note 23, at 104.
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